THE NEW DIVIDED CITY: CHANGING PATTERNS IN EUROPEAN CITIES

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ABSTRACT
Over the last 20 years there has been a vigorous discussion of evidence related to new and more intense social and spatial divisions within European cities. These contributions have identified social and spatial polarisation associated with globalisation, deindustrialisation and the increasing income inequalities arising from these. However, various 'moderating' factors were identified to explain why different outcomes were emerging in European cities than in their American counterparts. In this context much of the literature has focused on types of national welfare state and as these arrangements have come under pressure across Europe it may be expected that differences from the USA may decline. However there are other literatures that, rather than emphasizing the importance of national welfare states, refer to the stronger interventionist traditions of European governments and the distinctive characteristics of European cities. Differences in these dimensions within Europe – including those related to urban planning and decommodified housing – do not correlate with typologies of national welfare states and suggest continuing divergence within Europe and between Europe and the USA. Working within this framework, this introduction to a special issue argues that although European welfare states have weakened, other factors continue to sustain differences between European and American cities. When looking at newly emerging spatial patterns, the major economic and political changes experienced in countries in Central and Eastern Europe are important in explaining why these countries often show causes and effects that differ from their counterparts in Western Europe.

Key words: Segregation, globalisation, welfare state, urban policy, European cities, theory

INTRODUCTION
Research into spatial segregation is not new. The works of many researchers working within the Chicago School are known to all geographers. These human ecologists can be seen as the first group of researchers who systematically paid attention to the description of patterns of spatial segregation (see e.g. Burgess 1925; McKenzie 1925; Park et al. 1925). At the time this work was carried out, it was usual to regard the city as a separate entity: the wider world almost seemed not to exist and certainly not in the form of globalisation and internationalisation which are seen as important drivers of urban spatial segregation in the present era. Their field of study was Chicago and they described segregation as consisting of concentric zones (Burgess 1925), sectoral patterns (Hoyt 1939) or multiple nuclei (Harris & Ullman 1945). The zones, sectors and nuclei housed different parts of the population, and this is indeed the central issue of segregation. The old ecologists saw these patterns evolving as a consequence of processes of invasion.
and succession, finally leading to the dominance of a social group, or a limited number of social groups in a certain part of the city. Timms (1971) referred to the outcome, rather statically, as a mosaic of social worlds.

The critique of the Chicago School is well-known: they did not pay enough attention to the role of choice, preference and social action (see e.g. Hollingshead 1947), they relied too much on a biological model (Firey 1947; Jones 1960), and their models were essentially descriptive. Also, they almost totally neglected the possible influence of institutional and political factors and developed their ideas on the basis of a free market economy. This made their approach inadequate for countries where the role of the state has been prominent (Bassett & Short 1989; Denton & Massey 1991; Van Kempen & Özüekren 1998).

After the Chicago School, research into urban spatial segregation has evolved. The deductive social area analysis in the 1940s and 1950s (see e.g. Shevky & Williams 1949; Bell 1953; Shevky & Bell 1955) was followed by the inductive factorial ecology in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Murdie 1969; Robson 1969; Berry & Kasarda 1977). These approaches were also subjected to critical scrutiny and, again, one of the important criticisms was that the role of the state was barely acknowledged.

More than any other, the behavioural approach acknowledged that segregation should be seen as at least partly a result of individual preferences, perceptions and decisions. The resident decides if he or she wants to stay put or move house to a different dwelling in the neighbourhood or in another area elsewhere in the city or even beyond the city limits. Research on housing behaviour using the now famous concepts of place utility and thresholds (Wolpert 1965; Brown & Moore 1970) were easily incorporated in segregation research from the late 1970s onwards. Place utility is simply the level of satisfaction with the place where one lives. A discrepancy between the actual situation and one’s aspiration might lead to a move, but this happens only when a certain threshold is reached. Thus, dissatisfaction can become a driver of spatial developments when the level of dissatisfaction reaches a certain point (this point differs according to social group and even individual).

Behavioural approaches link preferences, choices and decisions of households directly to positions in the family life-cycle (see e.g. Clark & Dieleman 1996). Preferences are related to the number of family members, the age of the persons within this family and the household composition (Rossi 1955; Speare et al. 1975; Stapleton 1980; Clark et al. 1986) and can be expressed in terms of floorspace or the number of rooms in the dwelling, the type of dwelling, ownership (rented or owner-occupied) of the dwelling and the price of the dwelling. Because these different kinds of dwellings are generally located in different urban areas, segregation of different household types is the logical result.

The behavioural approaches were focused on choice and preferences and were criticised for paying too little attention to the constraints people faced in a housing system that embraced different tenures with different means of access to the market (see e.g. Murie et al. 1976; Hannett & Randolph 1988). Although some of the criticisms of behavioural approaches have been countered by researchers of the ‘choice’ school (Peach 1991) the neglect of the role of the state and institutional variables remains.

Rex and Moore’s (1967) Race, Community and Conflict marked the beginning of the institutional approach in housing and neighbourhood development research (Van Kempen & Özüekren 1998). They stated that (desirable) housing is a scarce resource and different groups are differently placed with regard to access to these dwellings (‘housing classes’). People are distinguished from each other by their capacity to negotiate access to different tenures within the housing system, and, particularly in the context of their research in Birmingham, UK, the ability to access subsidised high-quality council housing (Rex 1968). The association between income and housing quality was affected by the pattern of state intervention, for example in the form of ownership and provision of housing and the allocation rules and procedures to gain access to that stock.

Alongside this more sociological approach, research on the operation of the housing market increasingly constructed accounts of residential behaviour in terms of the different
patterns of ownership and control, access and allocation that related to housing tenures including state housing (Murie et al. 1976). With housing tenure seen as having a direct part in explaining where people lived, European accounts of residence began to diverge from those in North America. European researchers increasingly adopted a framework for analysis that referred to significant state and not-for-profit sectors (where access was determined by factors different than applied in the market) as well as market tenures (private renting and home ownership) that operated within distinctive regulatory frameworks. Within the institutional approach attention was also given to the role of housing managers and the implicit or explicit goals, values, assumptions and ideologies that guide them in their work and may have been detrimental for some groups and advantageous to others (Damer 1974; Damer & Madigan 1974; Fahl 1975, 1977; Lipsky 1980; Henderson & Karn 1987; Tomlins 1997).

In this special issue the focus of the papers is on the role of the state and other institutional factors affecting urban spatial differentiation. The argument is that these aspects matter. Papers from different parts of Europe are included and they each highlight how and to what extent various institutions play a role in what we might call the redefinition of social space in cities. It will also be clear that in most of these papers the wider context – of the country, the region and the world – forms an essential backdrop of the new developments. It will become clear that some developments are indeed new and can hardly be seen as a continuation of what happened two or three decades ago. The changing political system, as in Central and Eastern European countries (see e.g. Kovács 2009), or a changing role of the market and the concomitant reactions of institutions with money (like private developers), as in Turkey (Pınarcıoğlu & İşık 2009), are powerful drivers of segregation. The present role of the state is essential and because of this the typology of welfare states of Esping-Andersen (see later in this introduction) remains relevant. However, we will also argue that it is not only this perspective on the welfare state that matters. We will refer to the interventionist traditions of European governments and the distinctive characteristics of European cities. Differences in these dimensions within Europe – including those related to urban planning and decommodified housing – do not correlate with typologies of national welfare states and suggest continuing divergence within Europe and between Europe and the USA.

SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIVISIONS WITHIN CITIES

Over the last 30 years there has been a renewed debate about increased social divisions in cities associated with the aftermath of Fordism and global economic changes. Initial perspectives associated with Sassen (1991) were based on discussion of New York, London and Tokyo and emphasised how economic changes fed through into unequal incomes and social and spatial polarisation. Other authors expressed caution about the polarisation thesis. In their study of New York, Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) were concerned about reducing the complexity of the city's social structure to a dichotomy between two extremes in income distribution. Fainstein et al. (1992) emphasised the greater complexity of social restructuring and argued that there was clear evidence of the growth of a structurally defined underclass. They opted for a tripartite rather than a dual division of the social structure. Each of these contributions and the criticisms made by Hamnett (1998) were essentially based on data about social stratification and income distribution. Fainstein et al. (1992) referred to an earlier paper by Marcuse (1989) which offered broad-brush indications of locations with distinctive social roles in what Marcuse called a quartered city (New York) but went on to express caution, especially as many areas have a very mixed class composition (p. 262). The analysis of social divisions was finally referred to as 'sketchy' and more as a set of hypotheses for empirical testing than authoritative conclusions (p. 263). Also the slightly modified typology in Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a) was not based on empirical research, but put forward as a hypothesis.

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The hypothetical nature of assertions has remained a characteristic of much of the literature about differentiation within cities. A clear exception, however, is the literature that focuses on ethnic spatial segregation, where most authors clearly define concentration areas of minority ethnic groups, often after having calculated various indices of segregation (see e.g. Van Amersfoort 1992; Giffinger & Reeger 1997; Glebe 1997; Friederichs 1998; Kesteloot & Cortie 1998; Phillips 1998; Bolt et al. 2002, 2008; Musterd 2005; Van Kempen 2005). In most cases these studies are valuable because they pay attention to clear patterns of ethnic segregation and concentration and to causes of these patterns.

A European literature has developed following the initial hiatus of interest in divided cities (see Musterd & Ostendorf 1998; Marcuse & Van Kempen 2000b, 2002; Kazepov 2005a). This literature not only referred to megacities like London, but to a much wider group of cities and includes often some detailed empirical analysis. For example the papers included in Musterd and Ostendorf (1998) supported a view that cities affected by the same global economic pressures had different patterns of exclusion and segregation. The differences between welfare states were important elements in the explanation of this. The liberal welfare state of the USA generated outcomes different from the corporatist and social democratic welfare states in Europe. Different institutional and organisational arrangements impact on patterns of inequality. More employment within the public sector, stronger employment protection and benefit systems have had the effect of softening the impact of industrial restructuring: job loss may be reduced, the loss of income is reduced and the crises leading to relocation are less commonly experienced. The latter is affected by the different forms of regulation of the housing sector, including, in some cases, much greater direct provision of housing by the state and not-for-profit organisations (see also Marcuse & Van Kempen 2002; Van Kempen 2002b).

The role of the central and local state is seen as a major factor determining the distribution of housing. The changing character of the welfare state is a major topic for many housing and urban researchers in this respect (see e.g. Forrest & Murie 1990; Meusen & Van Kempen 1995; Murie & Musterd 1996; Musterd & Ostendorf 1998; Van Kempen & Priemus 1999; Van Kempen & Priemus 2002). In some cases the role of the state has never been very large, like in Belgium (Kesteloot et al. 1997; Kesteloot & Cortie 1998). Changing priorities within a welfare state can result in declining relative incomes among those who do not work and these state-dependent and other low-income households run the risk of ending up in those areas where dwellings have a (very) low rent.

Urban policies and housing policies are specifically important in determining which supply of housing can be found in what parts of the city. In Britain the most deprived households in some cities are concentrated in the social rented sector, while in other cities they are also in mixed tenure areas (Lee & Murie 1997). The large numbers of social rented dwellings in the Netherlands are concentrated in specific areas and these concentrations have engendered spatial concentrations of low-income groups (see e.g. Van Kempen & Van Weesper 1998).

The role of housing policy and urban policy figures prominently in the literature on spatial segregation in Western European cities (see e.g. Musterd & Ostendorf 1998). However, Ruoppila (2005) states that surprisingly few analyses of the role of housing policies in residential differentiation in Central and Eastern European cities exist. In Central and Eastern European countries there is a lot of literature on changing housing systems, but this does not take into account the effects on urban spatial differentiation (e.g. Struyk 1996; Lux 2003a, b). Also, the role of housing policy as a possible modifier of market forces, an important item in the Western European literature (see e.g. Murie & Musterd 1996; Preteceille 2000; Wessel 2000; Bolt et al. 2008), is not a prominent issue in Central and Eastern Europe (Ruoppila 2005).

The significance of welfare state arrangements becomes increasingly evident when macro-developments lead to more state-dependent households. Global economic restructuring has led to huge losses of industrial jobs in European cities. The increasing number of unemployed in post-Second World War areas is a result of this process, as has been
indicated by studies in for example, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Lee & Murie 2002; Van Kempen 2002b).

Another consequence of a welfare state in which priorities are changed is the impact on the quantity, quality, location, and allocation of the housing stock itself. Austerity programmes may lead to lower subsidies for housing. A deliberate choice to adopt a more market-oriented approach may lead to more and more expensive owner-occupied dwellings, while at the same time affordable dwellings are privatized or demolished to make place for these more expensive alternatives (see Bolt et al. 2009). As a consequence, low-income households are increasingly forced to find shelter in a declining public or social rented part of the housing market or in the least attractive and adequate parts of the private sector.

The importance attached to the welfare state leads towards a discussion of different types of welfare state and the wide use of the typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990). Esping-Andersen presents European countries as the archetypes of social democratic and corporatist regimes. In contrast, the USA is presented as the archetypal liberal welfare regime with minimal state intervention and this has been linked with greater inequalities in income and wealth and as generating more unequal social and spatial outcomes. The dominant discourse emerging from this has related to the degree of convergence on a liberal model associated with a weak welfare state and this has been linked with greater inequalities in income and wealth and as generating more unequal social and spatial outcomes. The dominant discourse emerging from this has related to the degree of convergence on a liberal model associated with a weak welfare state and the wide use of the typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990). Esping-Andersen presents European countries as the archetypes of social democratic and corporatist regimes. In contrast, the USA is presented as the archetypal liberal welfare regime with minimal state intervention and this has been linked with greater inequalities in income and wealth and as generating more unequal social and spatial outcomes. The dominant discourse emerging from this has related to the degree of convergence on a liberal model associated with a weak welfare state and this has been linked with greater inequalities in income and wealth and as generating more unequal social and spatial outcomes.

The New Divided City: Changing Patterns in European Cities

The Welfare State

Esping-Andersen (1990) has argued that the development of welfare regimes owed more to the specific historical and political development of countries than it did to stages in economic development or global processes. Welfare states are the product of local and national pressures rather than of reified social constructs or of global influences. Esping-Andersen emphasised the importance in the typology of welfare. Third, and growing out of this, we should refer to other comparative literatures that discuss differences between cities and between intervention patterns. The wider comparative government literature does not generate the same groups of ‘liberal’, ‘corporate’ or ‘social democratic’ types identified through Esping-Andersen’s work. If we are to develop a better understanding of how global pressures are translated into social and spatial differences, we need to refer to a more complex framework relating to the national and local welfare state and the degree of public intervention, especially in issues directly affecting the built environment and residence.

This introduction continues first by referring to the literature on welfare states. It suggests that a number of political and economic changes in Europe in the last two decades mean that there is a need to revise the initial perspective on national welfare regimes. It then refers to a different literature referring to traditions of public policy and governance. Finally it refers more directly to developments related to housing within Europe and suggests that significant differences and changes in this area will continue to affect future spatial and social divisions.
welfare state of rights and specifically of citizenship rights determining access to services. He associated this with decommodification or the extent to which people were entitled to services because of their citizenship status rather than because of their income.

Much of Esping-Andersen’s analysis grew out of detailed accounts of Sweden, Germany and the USA, but he operationalised decommodification by analysing arrangements for old age or retirement pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance referring to a wider group of countries. He examined eligibility rules, levels of income replacement and the range of entitlements offered. In effect, he assessed how generous, universal and redistributive pension, sickness and unemployment insurance systems were and how far different welfare states enabled people in older age, sickness or unemployment to maintain their livelihoods. Esping-Andersen provided a decommodification score for each of the three areas identified (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 52). From this and his wider discussion of path-dependency, Esping-Andersen referred to three kinds of welfare state regimes:

1. A liberal regime which is minimalist in its approach; has the most limited income replacement and the most limited decommodification. This is a welfare state regime which minimised the role of the state to that which was essential to maintain economic efficiency. The leading examples of this type of welfare state are North America and Australia.

2. Corporatist welfare states are more substantial than in the liberal system but are not concerned with redistribution. They are largely designed to support and preserve status differentials and key institutions including the church and the family. The key examples of these kinds of corporatist welfare state systems are Austria, France, Germany and Italy.

3. Finally, in social democratic welfare state regimes decommodification is much greater. There is a universalist approach and redistribution is a key aim of the welfare state, along with the promotion of equality. The Scandinavian countries are the key examples in this group.

One criticism of Esping-Andersen’s work was that he referred to a narrow range of welfare benefits to develop the typology that has attracted most attention. While the framework for analysis may be a good one, the operationalisation through a limited number of social security benefits does not provide an adequate basis to typify different welfare state systems.

Quantification based on a narrow range of services is highly problematic and is not a robust basis for categorising welfare systems. It is partly because of this that Esping-Andersen’s work has generated a series of suggestions for variation. These in particular arise in connection with systems that were not included in Esping-Andersen’s more detailed country studies (Sweden, Germany and USA). First, a number of accounts of welfare regimes have referred to the familialistic regimes in Southern Europe (Kazepov 2005b). Second, there has been discussion of the British case and of the tendency to locate the UK alongside the US in a liberal welfare state group encouraging others to refer to an Anglo-Saxon type. Esping-Andersen expressed difficulty in locating the UK within his framework and others have expressed caution or argued that the UK is a hybrid type because it combines ungenerous income replacement with socialised medical care and educational provision that is largely outside the market (Ginsburg 1992; Cochrane & Clarke 1993; Harloe 1995; Murie 1997). Mingione (2005) suggested a case for distinguishing between American welfare capitalism and a liberal-statist model of welfare capitalism in the UK or referring to the UK as a Beveridge type welfare state. The latter is distinguished by ‘far-reaching state intervention in welfare’. Others have taken issue with the idea of a ‘Scandinavian model’ based on Sweden with little reference to Norway, Denmark or Finland (Matheson & Wearing 1999). Finally, although the distinctive character of Central and Eastern Europe left them largely outside the analysis of welfare states, the dramatic political and economic changes after the late 1980s represented sharp breaks with the past or reconnections with earlier pre-state-socialist traditions and leaves a gap in representing their systems. All of these reservations provide grounds for real caution over assuming that outcomes in terms

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of social and spatial divisions will relate to Esping-Andersen’s categories.

WELFARE DRIFT

In the period since the 1980s, all European welfare states have experienced some movement from managed to market led approaches. The symptoms of crisis seem to be the same everywhere: labour market restructuring, higher unemployment and economic inactivity; more unequal remuneration and less redistributive taxation systems; a range of citizenship issues that have tended to add to unequal social rights (guest workers, refugees, asylum seekers). The responses have included the hollowing out of the state with less control over economic and social life, erosion of benefits affecting both older age and younger age groups and the encouragement of self-provisioning and asset-based welfare.

Increasing income inequality is apparent across Europe. For example, in the former state socialist systems in Central and Eastern Europe the reduction in the services and incomes provided by the state and the development of the private sector has generated greater income inequality and in turn has led to the development of high-income enclaves (Kovács 2009). In the UK, the greater income inequality associated with Thatcherism has remained in spite of subsequent economic and employment growth. In Germany the severe decline in pensions and other benefits has also been evident. In Finland, where there were also severe cuts in expenditure but where the strong welfare system appears to have remained more intact than elsewhere (see e.g. Blomberg & Kroll 1999), income inequality has grown and there has been increasing residential differentiation associated with this. Higher incomes inflate the prices in key parts of the housing market and generate greater social and spatial division even in a strong welfare state (Vaattovaara & Kortteinen 2003). Esping-Andersen (1996) himself referred to the crisis in the Swedish welfare state with severe cuts in benefits and a shift to active labour market policies. A period of welfare retrenchment (Svallfors 1999) involved the move from redistribution to actions to increase economic growth and competitiveness and this is presented as a further dimension of globalisation: the new economic policy and new urban policy are both necessary responses to global pressures and involve the state in a different role than in the golden age of welfare (Moulaert et al. 2003).

The changing role of the state is often referred to as a shift from government to governance. Local and national governments increasingly work together with other public agencies, with private firms and with inhabitants in order to reach a common goal, such as improving neighbourhoods or creating massive new economic zones in cities (such as the South Axis in Amsterdam). Examples also exist in which inhabitants and public agencies only act in the background, leaving large spatial developments mainly to private companies such as developers (the creation of shopping areas in Eastern Europe is an example here; see Taşan-Kok 2004).

While these changes do not undermine the emphasis that Esping-Andersen placed on path dependency they further caution against a tendency to regard this as path determinacy – that certain welfare regimes and the political coalitions that generated them become cultural insulators against liberalisation or dramatic change. Earlier decisions do constrain and affect the options open at any time but they do not prevent serious changes of direction. The new welfare state emerging from restructuring is more stratified and the associations between residence and income or social class are more clear-cut. Race dimensions are also more evident. The argument that the welfare state confirms peoples’ status rather than changes it has become more justifiable across Europe.

The pressure on budgets has led to a general reduction in the generosity of welfare benefits and this increased income inequality and the promotion of individual home ownership have increased household investment in housing, especially among middle and higher income groups. The new model welfare states generally put individual property ownership in a more central position, with a clear danger of increasing socio-economic segregation (Lee & Murie 1999, 2002; Van Kempen 2002b).
PUBLIC POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

While the literature on welfare state regimes has been highly influential, there are other important comparative analyses that suggest alternative patterns of difference between countries. For example Page and Goldsmith (1987) considered the traditions of central and local government relations in seven non-federal European countries and broadly distinguished two major groups. The first, a North European group (Britain, Denmark, Norway and Sweden), was associated with the development of directly provided welfare-state services in the post-Second World War years and local government had more functions and discretion than in a second, Southern group (France, Italy and Spain). Countries in this group are more heavily dependent on administrative regulation growing out of the Napoleonic code. Different religious traditions (Protestant North and Catholic South) were also associated with this division. Subsequently, John (2001) considered 15 Western European countries and concluded that the North-South distinction remained and had only been softened since the 1980s.

In a situation where welfare systems have not prevented the growth of income inequality, different public policy traditions become more important in determining how far income inequalities are reflected in restructuring processes without significant modification. Even where incomes are unequal, different agencies and partnerships for intervention may generate different processes and experiences of restructuring. This takes the agenda away from welfare regimes and towards the distinction between the stronger government and governance traditions and practices of North and West Europe and the weaker traditions and practices in Southern Europe and in Central and East Europe since the political changes at the start of the 1990s. The different impact of common economic processes is then explained by reference to democratic traditions, practices and policy cultures; but also to institutional and professional arrangements and the presence and capacity of non-market stakeholders including local government and housing associations.

THE PUBLIC RESPONSE

The public policy response to global economic change and industrial decline has involved agendas around urban competitiveness, regeneration and urban renaissance (see e.g. Friedrichs & Vranken 2000; Boddy & Parkinson 2004; Van Oort 2004; Buck et al. 2005; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2006; Ache et al. 2008). It is important to consider the nature of public policy. In ‘strong government’ situations there may have been a weakening of planning regimes to facilitate market developments and an increased emphasis on partnership and private/joint finance. The efforts of government have also tended to include enabling builders and developers and adopting policies to attract and retain high earners and especially those working in the knowledge intensive industries that are so often the focus of economic development strategies. Studies that emphasise underlying global changes and the diminution in the relative importance of the national institutional level highlight the ways in which local factors generate unique outcomes in each place (Moulaert et al. 2003).

In some local strategies housing and residence is more than a residual – but is a driver of economic competitiveness. For example the expansion of the knowledge intensive and creative industries (following, e.g. Landry 2000; Florida 2002; but see also Peck 2005) is seen as key to successful economic growth in the future (see also Lee & Murie 2004). In line with this, local economic development strategies have shifted away from inward investment and direct attraction of enterprises. The new emphasis on the attraction and retention of talent and the creative class involves a greater focus on soft factors – housing and neighbourhood, city living, mixed tenure and urban renaissance – a focus on making places that are attractive to talent and enterprising individuals.

In adopting strategies of this type, cities have different starting positions. Some have more favourable legacies (or again start to profit from these legacies; see Pınarçoglu & İşık 2009) and a different capacity to reshape neighbourhoods. This partly relates to land and property ownerships but also to traditions of working across administrative, organisational and sectoral boundaries (public, private and...
Different routes from industrial decline to urban competitiveness are also evident where there has been a major event, such as the Olympic Games in Barcelona. The very absence of explicit policy may also explain the pattern of development – for example, the nature of new knowledge-based industry in Sofia (Dainov et al. 2007).

Whatever starting point is referred to, the different capacity to adopt participative and integrated approaches is evident. For example, partnerships, participation and integrated, holistic strategies are more evident in the UK and the Netherlands than elsewhere and this may affect the outcomes associated with economic restructuring (see Van Boxmeer & Van Beckhoven 2005; Van Beckhoven 2006). Some countries are more inclined towards integrative approaches, partnerships and participation than others.

All of this begins to shift the emphasis away from generalised representations of national systems and towards the unevenness of policy and capacity associated with different local administrations. The reality of policy and practice is much more uneven than implied by national descriptions and the literature is littered with detailed accounts of the distinctive ways in which city administrations have contributed to the formation and transformation of urban areas – from Victorian provincial cities providing modern public utilities and other municipal services to slum clearance, planned development of city centres, new suburbs and transport systems and to post war reconstruction. What emerges from these accounts is the importance of local as well as national policy and finance and of local institutional arrangements, leadership and initiative that generates distinctive local outcomes.

A DISTINCTIVE WESTERN EUROPEAN CITY

The literature on welfare regimes and governance traditions focuses on national, organisational, institutional and political arrangements. While this has strengths, its weaknesses are evident where there is considerable regional, sub-regional and local variation, urban-rural differences or North-South (or other) divides within countries. If the focus of attention is on segregation within cities, it is appropriate to turn to an additional literature that is more concerned with cities. There is now a robust literature that highlights differences between the European city and its American counterpart (see e.g. Musterd & Ostendorf 1998; Marcuse & Van Kempen 2000b; Kazepov 2005a, b). Deep-seated differences between European and North American cities affect how industrial restructuring impacts locally – and this perspective should also inform our expectations of how for example Chinese or other Asian cities absorb economic change.

The distinctive Western European city thesis has been set out in a number of places (see e.g. Crouch 1999; Van Kempen 2002a; Häußermann & Haila 2005; Kazepov 2005a) and involves a number of key propositions. These are important in the discussion about patterns of social and spatial division within European cities and the drivers of change in these patterns. In summary these contributions indicate the following:

- Cities have always been partitioned.
- The form of and spatial division within European cities has been shaped by different factors than the North American city. There are different patterns of religious cleavage, family structures, industrial employment, class consciousness, class cleavage and conflict.
- Europe has a dense network of historic, medium-sized cities that have helped to shape the economic, political and social structure. City administrations and nation states were more important in shaping the economic and social structure than in America. In Europe the relatively generous welfare state and much stronger public services continued to modify the impact of market processes to a greater extent than in America. All of this has affected existing socio-spatial patterns and will continue to do so.
- European cities do not exhibit the same degree of segregation as US cities (Musterd 2005; Van Kempen 2005) and the explanations for this have to do both with the different histories of cities and the importance of race in American cities.
- New spatial divisions in European cities have not simply been generated by globalisation,
economic restructuring and the income differences associated with this. While these factors are a necessary part of the account of change they are not sufficient and account has also to be taken of resisters, inhibitors or moderating factors (Marcuse & Van Kempen 2000a).

- The nature of the welfare state and of different welfare state regimes moderates income inequalities and the impacts of shocks associated with economic restructuring, but also provides an institutional structure that shapes responses. The welfare state legacy in terms of organisational and financial capacity is a critical ingredient explaining why local impacts of common processes are so varied in different European cities and between European and American cities.
- Different patterns of land ownership and legacies in terms of housing (tenure, size, type, quality, and neighbourhood) also affect the spatial impacts of change. Patterns of residence do not conform simply to trade off models related to income, place of work and costs associated with travel to work.

It is important, in this debate about European cities, to recognise that the emphasis on contexts and institutions means that just as living in a European city is different from living in an American city, so there are differences within Europe and between living in cities in different parts of Europe. This European city perspective places considerable importance on institutions, history and path dependency. Within any given context institutions do not determine future directions but both constrain and enable change. They provide continuity and stability but as institutions learn or develop over time they also enable change. (Kazepov 2005b, pp. 8–9) The institutional mix in European cities, including the institutions associated with the welfare state; contribute to co-ordinate market economies in contrast with unco-ordinated ones such as the USA (Kazepov 2005b, p. 14). Essentially this argument applies to institutional arrangements related to infrastructure provision, the built environment and housing; but in these cases as well as there being organisational legacies there are concrete, physical products that also constrain and enable change.

A FOCUS ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

When talking about European cities, it will be clear that generalisations are dangerous. At least we should be aware of the crucial differences between socialist and capitalist urbanisation. Urbanisation in capitalist societies was led by market competition, private property, and, in different degrees, by the role of the national and local welfare state. Urbanisation in the former socialist countries originated from the collective ownership of land and infrastructure, strong central planning and comprehensive strategies for the development of the settlement pattern in each country (Enyedi 1996, p. 101). Central planning in combination with state ownership of land meant that urban development could be under much greater control than in capitalist societies (Smith 1996).

At the same time Enyedi (1996), suggests that these differences may be over-emphasised and the role of planning in the socialist countries may also be seen as only modifying the spontaneous processes of urbanisation to some extent. Also: the planning process resulted in a planned built environment, but social structures could not be planned. Enyedi is one of many researchers who share the idea of a more or less universal and similar pattern of urbanisation in Western and Eastern contexts (see also Harloe 1996; Tammaru 2001). Others have the view that urbanisation under socialism was principally different (Hamilton 1979; Sheppard 2000), especially because of its strong relation to industrialisation (Szelenyi 1996). One of the most prominent differences between socialist and capitalist cities was the lack of a suburban periphery in socialist cities (Häußermann 1996; Hirt 2007).

Egalitarianism was a popular guideline in socialist countries (Enyedi 1996, p. 110). Partly as a consequence of this, segregation in Central and Eastern European countries before the 1990s was not so characteristic of cities as was the case in Western countries at that stage (Smith 1996; Ruoppila 2005). However, there is also a slightly different view. Gentile and Sjöberg (2006, p. 703) state: 'Egalitarian ambitions notwithstanding, the socialist cities were characterised by a degree
of physical differentiation sufficient to foster significant inequalities, mainly with regard to housing provision both in terms of quantity and quality'.

Inequality was definitely not absent in the socialist city and while many areas might have been characterised by a socio-economic mix, it should also be clear that some individuals and families were better off in terms of housing conditions and home location than others (see e.g. Weclawowicz 1979, 2002; Musil 1987; Pichler-Milanovich 2001). Gentile and Sjöberg (2006, p. 708) state that the intensity and origin of socio-spatial patterns in socialist cities has been a matter of debate for several decades, but its existence has been confirmed in many cases (see e.g. Matthews 1979; Bater 1980 for Russia; Weclawowicz 1979; Dangschat 1987 for Poland).

Research into spatial segregation is not so widespread in Central and Eastern European countries, although especially after the political transformations of the early 1990s, some authors have produced interesting accounts of the changing patterns of segregation in those countries (see e.g. Kovács 1998; Ladányi 2002 for Hungary; Sykora 1999 for the Czech Republic; Ruoppila 2005 for Estonia). The main idea from many of these studies is often that residential segregation has increased since the early 1990s, and that especially the most attractive parts of inner cities and suburban areas have become the concentration areas for high-income populations, creating new patterns of socio-economic segregation (Szelenyi 1996; Kovács 1998; Kok & Kovács 1999; Sailer-Fliege 1999; Sykora 1999; Ruoppila 2005; Ouředniček 2007; Kähr & Tammaru 2008; Leetmaa et al. 2009; Spevec & Klempič Bogadi 2009). While most of the studies of socio-spatial segregation in the socialist cities focus on socio-economic segregation, a number of studies have focused on the ethnic dimension in the socialist period (e.g. Rukavishnikov 1978; Hamilton & Burnett 1979; both cited in Gentile & Sjöberg 2006). After the 1990s, research into ethnic patterns became more prominent in the then post-socialist countries (e.g. Ladányi 1993, 2002; Gentile 2003; Gentile & Tammaru 2006).

In this introduction we are not able to fully explore the patterns of segregation in the socialist city, but some words help to clarify the situation. Most authors agree that until the mid-1970s the large housing estates that were so prominent at the outskirts of the socialist cities were not the ‘slums of despair’ of the city (Hirt 2007). On the contrary: they had a clear middle-class character. Older and poorer families were concentrated in the, sometimes dilapidated, inner cities and these areas gradually attracted immigrants, often Gypsies. Only towards the end of the socialist period had some of the large housing estates begun to lose their middle-class population as it gradually became possible for them to move to newer, more attractive areas, often in suburban environments. Some inner-city areas also started to show signs of gentrification (Szelenyi 1996). These trends of suburbanisation and gentrification continued after the political turnarounds in the early 1990s and gained in importance. At the same time researchers started to focus more and more on these processes of gentrification and suburbanisation (e.g. Kovács 1998; Tammaru 2001; Hirt 2007). Probably the most new significant development in Central and Eastern European countries is the emergence of patches of new and renovated houses in the urban areas. High-income groups have been particularly attracted to these new, commercial developments and this has led to new patterns of urban spatial segregation. New blocks were built on greenfield sites, accelerating processes of suburbanisation, but in some cases also old structures in the inner cities were demolished to make space for more luxurious developments (Buckwalter 1995; Ruoppila 2005). In fact, this is nothing different from Western countries including the UK and the Netherlands (see e.g. Van Kempen & Priemus 1999), where old structures are also demolished to make place for newer, and more luxurious developments. However, the background is different: in many Western countries the motivation to demolish and rebuild is mainly found in the wish to mix population categories in a neighbourhood, while in Central and Eastern European countries new developments emerge as a consequence of a more active private sector, without a wish to create a mixed population, but working from pure profit considerations.
THE LEGACY OF DECOMMODIFIED HOUSING

The discussion of the distinctive European city introduces a direct reference to land and housing and this is the final element in understanding social and spatial division. Rodriguez et al. (2003, p. 32) state that:

heightening processes of social polarization and exclusion have accompanied the dynamics of economic restructuring and globalization. Processes of exclusion always operate in and through social space and nowhere has this been more evident than in urban areas. The rising concentration of excluded populations in certain geographical areas is an integral component of urban socio-economic change while social divisions are compounded by spatial segregation. The latter, in turn, is often reinforced by a reorganization of land rents and housing prices that reflects the recomposition of urban space sought by the new urban policy.

However, whether and how land rents and housing prices are adjusted depends on patterns of ownership and control and the nature of regulation and organisation of the housing sector. And this raises issues about tenure and security of tenure and about whether households experiencing low income or income decline have the ability to cope without moving.

Perhaps more important is the new dynamic created in cities by the decisions of the more affluent and the process of translating income differences into wealth differences. One important sphere for expenditure and investment by affluent households has been in land and housing. This has been affected by uncertainties about the relative strength of investment in other spheres – particularly in stocks and shares and private pensions. A disproportionate share of the expenditure of higher income groups (including annual bonuses and performance related additions) has gone into housing investment: greater income inequality has been a direct driver of inflation of house prices. Housing has become a key investment for those with higher incomes: the explosion of house prices in certain parts of the market and growing differentials in prices have become more apparent in all European cities.

The statistical data on housing in Europe (Federcasa 2006; Ghekiere 2007) indicate that European housing systems are now all market dominated and this is likely to be more rather than less so over the next 20 years. Two main groups of countries can be identified according to the strength of decommodified housing provision. Thirteen EU member states have more than 75 per cent of their housing in the owner-occupied sector. This is the largest group and includes most of the Eastern and Central European countries. It also includes Southern European countries where subsidy and taxation arrangements favouring home ownership may be seen as part of the approach to the welfare state and were not accompanied by a parallel support for decommodified public sector housing. Only two of this Southern, Eastern and Central European group have more than a minimal social rented sector. In these countries the sorting of population between neighbourhoods emerges largely from market transactions and relates to market prices and affordability. While this may predispose to a US style pattern, differences remain. If a longer time scale is considered, this group includes two major identifiable sub-groups: countries which have never had significant non-market housing and those which had significant non-market housing in the past. While much of Southern Europe has long been dominated by private housing (owned and rented), the practices in relation to the operation of the market may differ – property may be seen as a family asset rather than a commodity that is regularly bought and sold. In Eastern and Central Europe where there was significant state or not-for-profit housing in the past, deregulation and privatisation have had a major impact over the last 30 years. Consequently some of the Eastern and Central European countries that had the largest state housing sectors are now the most market dominated – although the way that the market works continues to be affected by this distinctive history.

The second major group that can be identified within the EU consists of countries with relatively large (over 17%) decommodified, social rented sectors. None of these countries have the highest levels of home ownership
although their tenure structures vary and especially in Sweden and Denmark forms of co-operative ownership complicate the picture. This group largely consists of Northern European countries and to that extent follows the pattern identified by Page and Goldsmith (1987) and John (2001). The overall pattern does not conform to that suggested by Kemeny (1995, 2005) and Lowe (2004), who refer to an Anglo-Saxon model and present English-speaking nations as culturally inclined towards home ownership in a way that does not apply to other European countries. In practice the decommodified sector was larger in Britain and the level of owner-occupation in Britain is partly contributed to by an explicit promotion of home ownership, and an active privatisation in recent years. Nor does the pattern conform to Esping-Andersen’s ranking of national welfare states. The Netherlands occupies the highest housing decommodification territory on its own while the UK sits alongside France, Austria and the Scandinavian high decommodification countries. The differences in housing decommodification, measured in this way, are also more striking than differences in Esping-Andersen’s combined decommodification score.

Both decommodified housing sectors and private markets are embedded in specific legal, financial and institutional arrangements. The meanings and practices attached to different places and parts of tenures are affected by social and cultural factors and it is only within this context that the pattern of tenure difference determines the pattern of social and spatial division. Initially, however, it is evident that if tenures, or specific segments of tenures, are spatially concentrated and cater for a narrow segment of the social structure they predispose countries to segregation. While much attention has been placed on the explicit and increasingly residual role of the social rented class to households dependent on benefits and from a broad cross-section of employed households to a high proportion of young households at the start of their housing careers or elderly people at the end of their housing careers (see Forrest & Murie 1983). The profile of the social rented sector within Europe has been changing in recent years with residualisation becoming evident to a greater or lesser extent wherever a significant social rented sector existed. For example Van der Heijden (2002) presented data for six Western European countries in the 1990s (the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium and Sweden) and refers to income distributions within tenures. The three countries with the largest social rented sectors – the Netherlands, Great Britain and Sweden – show obsolete dwellings and will lose value as a result. Within market sectors variations in quality, condition and maintenance are likely to also reflect the incomes of both owners and occupiers.

THE CHANGING POPULATION IN THE SOCIAL RENTED SECTOR

When talking about spatial segregation, the location of the social rented sector can be crucial. In countries with a relatively large number of social rented dwellings, low-income households are disproportionately represented in this sector. When the social rented sector is concentrated in specific areas of the city, which is usually the case, spatial concentrations of low-income households can be expected. However, the social rented sector does not only house low-income households and it does not house all low income households. As has been indicated for the Netherlands and the UK (see e.g. Murie & Priemus 1994; Meusen & Van Kempen 1995) there is considerable social mix in the social rented sector, although this was more explicit in the past. As previously discussed, before the political changes in Central and Eastern European countries, the rented sectors in these countries were also associated with considerable social mix.

The debate in recent years about the changing population in the social or public rented sector has referred to residualisation – the tendency over time for the social base of these sectors to narrow from the affluent working class to households dependent on benefits and from a broad cross-section of employed households to a high proportion of young households at the start of their housing careers or elderly people at the end of their housing careers (see Forrest & Murie 1983). The profile of the social rented sector within Europe has been changing in recent years with residualisation becoming evident to a greater or lesser extent wherever a significant social rented sector existed. For example Van der Heijden (2002) presented data for six Western European countries in the 1990s (the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium and Sweden) and refers to income distributions within tenures. The three countries with the largest social rented sectors – the Netherlands, Great Britain and Sweden – show
a much higher proportion of lower income deciles in the social rented sector. In these three countries social rented housing plays a distinctive and differential role in providing housing disproportionately for lower income groups.

There are a number of important trends that have affected the role and size of the social rented sector in European countries. In most countries, including the Central and Eastern European countries, there has been a common promotion of home ownership. In some cases this has included deregulation and privatisation that has provided the opportunity for subsequent commodification. In addition to this, and especially in the UK and the Netherlands, there have been active policies to achieve regeneration and to reshape the least attractive estates. This often involves considerable demolition of social rented dwellings and building of more expensive alternatives in the owner-occupied sector, leading to neighbourhoods of more mixed tenure. These different changes have resurrected debates about gentrification and contribute to greater differentiation between estates and neighbourhoods and to new spatial patterns within cities. Neighbourhoods previously largely insulated from the market are now less insulated and some are wholly exposed to market processes. The new housing developments create opportunities for middle- and high-income households, but diminish the choices for low-income households. They can find alternatives in fewer and fewer places, when inexpensive (social) rented dwellings disappear because of demolition. Until now it is clear that these mixed tenure strategies do lead to more mixed neighbourhoods. It is however unclear if they lead also to stronger concentrations of low-income households, although it would be logical to expect this when fewer alternatives are available in fewer places.

CONCLUSION: THE NEW EUROPEAN DIVIDED CITY

This introduction started with a brief overview of the various traditions that have been drawn upon to explain urban spatial segregation. Most of the earlier approaches and those emanating from the USA did not pay much attention to the role of the state and to governance aspects. In this paper we have emphasised that these aspects have been crucial in European cities in the past and remain crucial. We have suggested that general ideas of the role of the welfare state in explaining divisions within cities are still relevant, but that it is important to refer to other aspects, and particularly to public policy interventions directly impacting on land and housing development.

This paper has been written from a perspective that sees European cities as having coped with the economic pressures of the last three decades in a different way than American cities. There have been different institutional arrangements that have mediated processes and moderated the outcomes of economic change. The social and spatial outcomes of common economic pressures have consequently not been the same. The American accounts of globalisation and polarisation tend to neglect the existence of the welfare state (because it has been relatively undeveloped in the US), to give national and local policy little importance (for the same reason) and to ignore the role of the state and not-for-profit housing (because it is unimportant in most US cities). This leaves the American accounts of segregation almost wholly accounts of the working of economic and market processes, although race figures very prominently (see also Goldsmith 2000).

The development of European cities has not followed the same pattern as in America and three contributors to difference have been emphasised in this paper: different traditions in relation to the welfare state, interventionist government and decommodified housing. These three contributors are often complementary: decommodified housing usually plays a bigger role in countries with traditions of interventionist government. Because of these and other factors the impact of common global pressures and deindustrialisation on spatial and social inequalities has not followed American patterns. The assertions about how economic restructuring impacts on American cities should not be assumed to be a guide to emerging patterns in European cities.

Each of these three sources of difference have been altered in recent years. The welfare state has become a less effective brake on
income inequality, interventionist government has developed new policy approaches that are more market oriented and decommodified housing has been subject to privatisation and modernisation agendas. But in none of the three areas have these actions removed the differences that exist between Europe and America. At the same time it is inaccurate to assume that no change has occurred or to assume that there has been a common reduction in the strength of these factors across Europe. Even though the welfare state and decommodified housing have themselves been under pressure from globalisation, different legacies remain. These include physical legacies, such as the vast areas of social rented housing in some European countries (e.g. Sweden, the Netherlands, France and the UK). They also include institutional legacies that are embedded in policy, practice and professions and affect the way policy is made and implemented. The organisational and financial resources available at national, regional and local levels and in public, private and voluntary sectors and the ways that different actors operate within and across boundaries and interact with one another is affected by this legacy and in turn affects both policy and action.

The outcome of economic restructuring in European cities, as indicated by the contributions in this special issue, is that while differences from America remain, variations within Europe appear to have become more marked. A number of reasons for this changing comparison between European cities can be advanced. These relate to the erosion of the national welfare state and the pattern of change in the economy and income inequality but also to the extent to which land use and planning systems and wider local governance mediates these effects. Those parts of Europe with weaker governance capacity and weakened welfare states (especially the former state socialist countries and perhaps Southern Europe) have moved closer to the American model (see for example the papers on Istanbul, Budapest and Tallinn in this issue). Where land use planning arrangements are weak and land ownership facilitates private and speculative development income inequalities translate into American style patterns of city growth, sprawl and gated developments (see Pınarçıoğlu & İşık 2009). Where there are stronger resisters in municipal or third sector agencies with effective organisational and financial capacity (as in the UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavia; see, e.g. Bolt et al. 2009; Murie 2009) income inequality influences the pattern and pace of change but will not generate the same spatial patterns. We cannot derive the pattern of social and spatial division within cities from evidence about economic change and income inequality alone and must engage with factors that mediate the spatial impact of these. In this context consideration of national welfare regime type as represented for example in Esping-Andersen’s typology is insufficient and local governance including land use planning and land ownership and the capacity of municipal and third sector agencies to act independently and to influence the decisions of other agencies are likely to be more important.

While economic restructuring and the increased latent income inequality associated with the impacts of this are a key part of these dynamics, they are not sufficient to explain the different social and spatial patterns emerging in European cities. New social divisions emerging in European cities also relate to a new competition around housing, land and property investment and a crisis for others around affordability. The inequalities in incomes that developed in earlier phases, but were restricted from expressing themselves spatially, are more able to do this in cities where the decommodified housing sector is smaller and where market processes are the strongest determinants of both production and access to housing. Where privatisation has modernised the housing market and patterns of new construction has added to differentiation and increased stratification within the market there are changes in the pattern of social and spatial division. New territories for investment by businesses and public policy partners (municipalities and housing associations) but also new patterns of investment by affluent households are apparent, especially in city centres.

A second wave effect with spatial inequalities becoming more apparent and acting to generate further inequalities builds on but also transforms social inequalities. New or sharper fault lines are emerging within tenures and between
residential neighbourhoods with different status and investment returns. This does not imply convergence within Europe – trajectories driven by the same processes will continue to generate different outcomes and differences in the share of decommodified housing as well as differences in housing and regeneration policies and their implementation remain important. In this context home ownership is no longer a category that has much meaning for comparison between cities or countries. It is too large a category that embraces too many distinctive histories and material differences. Comparisons need to engage with parts of the home ownership sector and recognise stratification within that sector as a key element in social and spatial division.

The factors which delayed, resisted or altered the pattern of social and spatial change in Europe and have maintained differences from America have themselves undergone change. The factors that explain why European cities have experienced a different pattern of neighbourhood change and residential differentiation arising from common global and economic pressures continue to have an impact. But we need to reassess what this impact is. These factors have not been removed or reduced to a US model and rather than convergence on this model there is continuing divergence.

A number of factors come together to suggest that over the next 20 years there will be important pressures affecting the housing sector and communities in European cities and that these will be uneven in their impact. Some issues relate to the capacity of the housing sector to respond to changes elsewhere. Whether cities experience population growth or decline, tensions and competition will be generated in the housing sector; economic changes and increased income inequality are likely to both stretch the market and leave some households unable to access housing; and increased energy costs will impact unevenly. The greatest risks of housing adding to other inequalities rather than mitigating them are in parts of Europe where there is neither a social rented sector, strong policy capacity nor the resources to address problems within the housing sector and where consequently there are greater risks that segregation and specialisation of neighbourhoods will undermine attempts at integration and social cohesion. Whether the tensions are associated with growth (demographic and economic) or decline (in population and relative income) there is less capacity to absorb the shock where there is a limited social rented sector and a significant population of low income home owners and where the demand for properties is too low (and affordable alternative places to move to non-existent) for households to deal with problems by moving house.

Patterns of change are likely to be uneven within European countries. The progress of residualisation within the decommodified housing sector is uneven and the divisions within home ownership sectors are affected by distinctive legacies and past policy as well as current market processes. In rural and suburban areas it is more common to have zones where dwellings are mixed in design, type and size – and because of this have different market positions. Affordability issues will become more marked in some of these areas and in the centres of economic growth where lower income households will often be excluded from good market housing. Exclusive, high income enclaves and gated communities have become more evident in city centres and elsewhere. In contrast, the least attractive and worst managed monolithic housing areas built in the post-Second World War period are likely to be places with an increasing concentration of problems. There are particular problems associated with some mass housing estates and areas of older housing elsewhere. High population turnover and relocation and energy and fuel poverty problems will become severe in these and similar areas especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

The implications of this account are that research on divided cities needs to engage much more with residence and new patterns of investment associated with housing and not to simply deduce spatial and social impacts from evidence about economic restructuring or welfare regimes. The research agenda needs to engage more directly with five dimensions. First it needs to address the significance of different political and financial arrangements, organisational culture and the capacity (at different spatial scales) to effect change. This
includes revitalisation strategies and their impacts. Second it needs to address the significance of the changing and weakening of welfare state redistribution and with increased partitioning of citizenship rights. Third it should address the key dimensions of demographic change and international migration which will affect the particular trajectories of different cities. Fourth it should directly identify the role of state for social remnant and their role in urban projects. The study should address the key dimensions of demographic change, including revitalisation strategies and their impacts. Finally it should put new patterns of housing investment and of residence at the heart of the account.

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