The boundaries of suburban discontent? Urban definitions and neighbourhood political effects

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Residents of city and suburban neighbourhoods have diverged in the way they vote, with inner-city dwellers preferring political parties on the left while suburbanites increasingly vote for parties on the right. Yet it is not clear whether such a division is more evident between residents of central and suburban municipalities (the jurisdictional hypothesis), or between residents of neighbourhoods differentiated by urban form and, by assumption, lifestyle (the morphological hypothesis). While there are clear reasons for the predominant reliance on municipal differences in research based in the U.S. and other countries, it is not evident that these reasons apply in the Canadian context. This article examines how urban boundaries articulate electoral differences between metropolitan residents in Canada's three largest urban regions, using aggregate election data for federal elections between 1945 and 2000, survey data from the 2000 Canada election study and a series of indices developed by the author. It is found that while trends towards city–suburban polarization are similar regardless of the boundaries used to define the zones, in the Canadian case the results are stronger and more significant when boundaries based on urban form (between pre-and post-war development) are employed. The implications of these results for the relationship between urban space and political values in Canadian cities are then discussed.

Le comportement électoral des habitants des métropoles canadiennes diffère selon le lieu de résidence. Les électeurs des quartiers centraux votent de préférence pour des partis politiques de gauche, alors que les habitants des banlieues votent de plus en plus pour des partis de droite. Toutefois, il n'est pas certain qu'une telle division s'observe entre les résidents de municipalités situées dans les zones centrales et ceux en périphérie (l'hypothèse des juridictions), ou entre les résidents de quartiers qui se distinguent par la forme urbaine et, par supposition, par le style de vie (l'hypothèse de la morphologie). Si les recherches aux États-Unis portent davantage sur les différences entre les municipalités, la question n'a pas été étudiée de manière systématique au Canada. Dans cet article, la question est de savoir quelles sont les frontières qui exposent le plus clairement les différences électorales entre les résidents des trois plus importantes régions métropolitaines du Canada. L'analyse utilise des données agrégées issues des scrutins fédéraux tenus de 1945 à 2000 et des résultats d'un sondage sur les élections canadiennes de 2000, en plus d'un indice de déséquilibre zonal que l'auteur a développé. Si les tendances se maintiennent en ce qui concerne la polarisation intra-urbaine, peu importe les frontières utilisées pour définir les zones, les résultats obtenus sur les trois villes canadiennes sont plus significatifs lorsque les frontières définies

en fonction de la forme urbaine sont utilisées dans l'analyse des différences entre la ville et la banlieue. Les conclusions ont des incidences sur les relations entre l'espace urbain et les valeurs politiques.

Introduction

Canadian metropolitan dwellers have diverged in the way they vote in federal and provincial elections and in their political values, depending on whether they live in the inner city or the suburbs (Walks 2004a, 2004b). This mirrors trends that have been developing in the U.S. for some time (Gainsborough 2001), which led early commentators to claim that suburbanization portended the 'Republicanization of America' (Harris 1954; Phillips 1969). Suburban 'discontent' in the U.S. is borne out by low levels of trust in upper levels of government, and animosity towards the welfare state, particularly towards targeted programs helping the poor, blacks and central cities (Thomas 1998; Oliver 2001; Gainsborough 2001). There has been continued debate on whether divergence is due to self-selection (particularly, of those with more 'conservative' values into the suburbs) or conversion effects (related to the effects of place, or 'neighbourhood effects') (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Cox 1969; Gainsborough 2001). Regardless, because population growth is concentrated in newer suburban areas, presidential and congressional candidates for political office are said to be increasingly dependent on following a 'suburban strategy' at election time, based on luring suburban voters with low taxes, the 'streamlining' of government services, and attacks on 'big' government (Schneider 1992; Greenberg 1995; Thomas 1998).

A similar situation would appear evident in the Canadian context, where polarization in support for the main parties dates back to 1979 (Walks 2005). By the time of the 2000 election, residents of the outer suburbs of the three largest metropolitan regions were significantly more likely to hold attitudes to the 'right' of the rest of Canada concerning tax cuts, the relative power of business and labour, responsibility for the poor, and the benefits of the welfare state, whereas inner-city residents were to the 'left' in their attitudes towards federal spending, health

care privatization and the power of business (Walks 2004b). While the federal Liberals have been able to hold onto many suburban seats, the coupling of rapid suburbanization and the suburban shift to the right has worked to elect of a number of right-wing provincial governments. In Ontario during the 'Mike Harris' years the Progressive Conservative (PC) party relied heavily on support from the '905' suburbs for its victories while the inner cities were hardly represented in government (Walks 2004a). Indeed, a number of authors have associated suburbanization with the neo-liberal turn in Canadian federal and provincial government policy (Dale 1999; Donald 2002a; Keil 2000; Walks 2004a). The mechanisms producing city–suburban political divergence are not completely clear. However, case-study survey research in one district of Toronto suggests that it is foremost explained by self-selection (particularly of left-leaning voters into the inner cities), followed by the effects of local experience and mode of consumption (Walks 2006).

But it might be asked what does a 'suburb' or an 'inner city' mean, and whether the categorical definitions employed are the most efficacious at capturing intra-urban spatial discrepancies in political responses. Two main types of zonal definitions are prominent in the literature. Jurisdictional definitions based on municipal boundaries are the most common in the U.S. context, while functional definitions built around conceived differences in urban form and lifestyle are more often used to delineate suburbs and cities in Canada (and in the U.K.). It is yet unclear which one of these definitions is most applicable to understanding political differentiation within Canadian metropolitan regions. The determination of the most appropriate boundary has theoretical as well as practical implications, as the form the boundary takes tells us something about the types of geographic processes that may be producing intra-urban differentiation, and in turn, informs a theory of how urban space may

be related to the production of political practices and ideology.

This article first examines competing definitions of inner cities and suburbs in U.S. and Canadian urban analysis, and then discusses the importance of each type of definition for understanding and adjudicating the mechanisms that potentially produce city–suburban political differentiation in North American metropolitan areas. The article then empirically compares degrees of zonal differentiation in federal party support within Canadian urban regions when each type of zonal definition is employed, using aggregate election data for all federal elections between 1945 and 2000 and data from the 2000 Canada election survey. The article concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of the findings for understanding zonal political disparities in Canada.

The Boundaries of Urban Definitions

It is unclear whether traditional distinctions between city and suburb are applicable in the contemporary period. Writing in the U.S. context (but broadly applicable across North America), Jackson (1985, 6) pinned the difference on population density (high in cities, low in suburbs), commuting status (suburbanites commute elsewhere to work, city residents work nearby), home ownership (tenants in cities, owners in suburbs) and land-use practice (suburbs are residential in character while cities are mixed use). Yet, the fact of gently sloping population densities across Canadian metropolitan regions and low population densities in a number of inner-city neighbourhoods (Filion *et al.* 2004), increasing cross-commutes (Miller and Shalaby 2003), growing rental affordability problems at the fringes (Bunting *et al.* 2004) and a long history of industrial suburbs (Harris and Lewis 1998; Walker and Lewis 2004) suggest that Jackson's criteria do not help us much in deciding where to draw the boundary. Neither does Fishman's (1987) definition of 'true' suburbs as rooted in British ideals of aristocratic country lifestyles and bourgeois notions of the family. While cities and suburbs might have been distinguished in the nineteenth century by differences in familial lifestyle or rural evocation, it is much less clear that such criteria are relevant in the post-war era.

Of course, as Harris (2004, 49) notes, suburbs and suburban life share few of the qualities of rural life, and so cannot seriously be seen as any 'marriage' between, nor the 'offspring' of, city and country. Instead, suburbanization must be understood as a subset of the urbanization process. Many neighbourhoods, which began as fringe residential or industrial suburbs, have ultimately ended up being subsumed by urban development of various kinds. Many of the neighbourhoods that Canadians currently associate with the inner city began as remote residential suburbs that were eventually annexed by the largest and/or oldest municipalities (Smith 2006). It might be questioned that if such is the historical trajectory of fringe residential communities, does it even make sense to compare inner cities and suburbs as if they were separate types of communities, with different effects on residents' political positions?

While there are some difficulties in distinguishing between the suburbs and cities of the pre-war period, a time in which the economic, technological and political 'forces of centred urbanism' arguably helped organize a tight, symbiotic, and fluid relationship between them (Rae 2004), there are both empirical and theoretical grounds for differentiating between the post-war versions of these zonal forms. Empirically, with the exception of some prairie/western cities, there is the historical fact that the annexation of fringe communities to central city municipalities slowed drastically after the 1920s, and particularly after 1950, both in Canada (Sancton 2000, 2006; Harris 2004) and the U.S. (Teaford 1987; Oliver 2001). Initially, this was due to the fiscal crises of the inter-war years that fuelled the reluctance of the central cities to take on new debts. However, in the post-war period the lack of annexation activity is to a greater degree related to an antagonistic political relationship between city and suburb, framed not only by the significant decline, obsolescence, and perceived poor social environment of central-city housing, neighbourhoods and infrastructure, but also the emerging politics of regional coordination, municipal consolidation and fiscal tax sharing which threatened both suburban and central-city

interests (Teaford 1997; Frisken 2001). Metropolitanization worked to define newer suburban communities in terms of their political relationships with central-city municipalities to a much greater degree than in the pre-war era. In Canada, the establishment of regional governments often helped struggling suburbs leverage more power and resources from their reluctant central cities (Frisken 2001; Sancton 2006). The widespread application of low-density zoning and other planning controls in the post-war period has worked to prevent the subsequent re-development of residential areas on the same scale as occurred before the First World War. Some even see zoning as the main culprit maintaining low-density 'sprawl' and preventing the suburban densification that would have otherwise occurred under the more laissez-faire market conditions prevailing before the war (Fischel 1999; Levine 2006).

More conceptually, a number of scholars suggest that the dominant forms of urban development produced in the post-war era are theoretically distinct from both the inner cities and the traditional residential suburbs of the past. Indeed, what often goes by the name 'suburb', it is argued, is really a brand new form of city with its own internal logic. In such a new form the importance of proximity in residential location decisions is reduced while the value of amenity is exaggerated (Bunting and Filion 1999; Filion *et al.* 1999). Partly, this can be attributed to the very different forms of planning, layout and infrastructure necessitated by the fact that such places have been built to accommodate the automobile (Sheller and Urry 2000). Because such new post-war forms of cities developed without the constraints placed upon them by such 'forces of centred urbanism' they often developed literally 'inward, as it were, from their outer edges' (Evenden 2000, 38). The result is that it is not their cores but their boundaries that give these new suburban forms their identity (Evenden 2000). As urban populations have grown, it is argued these suburbs have become the 'centre' of society, potentially reducing old inner city areas to a 'specialized neighbourhood' type (Evenden and Walker 1993, 251). This new form of city is increasingly the destination of the majority of work-related trips originating within it, is mixed-use, socially diverse, and covers the ma-

jority of the metropolis (not only at the urban fringe). Thus, although clearly distinct in form from the inner cities, it contradicts traditional conceptions of 'suburbia' (Harris 2004, 19). In its place, new monikers have been proposed, including Technoburbs (Fishman 1987), Postsuburbia (Kling *et al.* 1991), Exopolis (Soja 1992) and the Dispersed City (Bunting and Filion 1999).

It is this post-war suburban form that has been tied to a new politics of 'discontent' and 'selfishness' in Canada (Dale 1999). Yet, the boundaries and processes that best articulate political differentiation within metropolitan regions remain to be interrogated. There are two basic models. In either model, political divergence could result from conversion or self-selection/transplantation mechanisms. However, the factors behind such mechanisms differ.

In the first model, what is here termed the jurisdictional hypothesis, city–suburban political differentiation is a result of municipal differences in governance structures, social composition, service capacities and fiscal policies. The assumption is that residents choose (self-select into) municipalities based on utility maximization criteria, and that a sufficient number of choices are present which allow them to do so (Tiebout 1956), and/or that municipal communities evolve separate political cultures which reflexively evolve in relation to the place-based demands of their taxpayers, and which then act to convert newcomers (Fischel 2001). As municipalities segregate populations based on ability to pay, service needs and social composition, their boundaries are then expected to articulate political and ideological divisions.

The second model relates to the morphological hypothesis. In this model, it is mainly lifestyle differences between the denser, more mixed-use and transit-friendly urban forms of the old pre-war cities and the low-density, auto-dependent nature and separated land uses of the newer post-war cities/suburbs, which encourage a different politics of space. Morphological differences may lie behind the varied neighbourhood preferences of certain social groups. The work of Ley (1996, 2003) and Caulfield (1994) suggests that the pre-war city acts as an expressive and performative setting for a segment of the new middle class whose left-liberal politics and preferences for 'authentic' neighbourhoods are defined

partly in relation to the conformism assumed to be inherent in post-war suburban lifestyles. Such a perspective is supported by the work of Walks (2006) who found that self-selection on behalf of supporters of the New Democratic Party (NDP) into older housing in pre-war neighbourhoods was the mechanism that best explained city–suburban discrepancies in party preferences in one district in Toronto. In the U.S. context, Schneider (1992) posits that the predominant lifestyle and form of low-density suburbs typical of the post-war era allow those who crave order, security and a hyper-controlled environment to retreat into a private space. Meanwhile, the conversion perspective is reflected in the cultural arguments of Sewell (1991) who suggests that the low densities of the 'new' post-war city stress self-reliance and protect residents from having to relate to others, while private transportation, the lack of public spaces, and the daily auto commute reinforce the sense that one is alone and in constant competition with others. Sewell contrasts this with the 'old' pre-war city, in which higher densities, public spaces, and public transportation are seen to force people of different class and ethnic backgrounds to mix, respect each other's differences, and remind participants that they are part of a larger community. In the U.S. context, Hogen-Esch (2001) suggests that a new form of politics has arisen built around what he terms a 'suburban land-use vision', based primarily on the maintenance of a high-amenity and high-consumption lifestyle in the face of growing fiscal and social pressures in lower-density, automobile-dependent environments (though in his case study it is notably articulated in new movements for municipal autonomy).

The jurisdictional hypothesis is the most common basis for zonal definitions in the U.S. including the main studies examining city–suburban discrepancies in voting behaviour and political representation (Wolman and Marckini 1998; Saurzopf and Swanstrom 1999; Gainsborough 2001). There are a number of good reasons for this in the U.S. context. First, as Teaford (1997) and Oliver (2001) demonstrate, there are significant discrepancies in the size and government structure of U.S. cities and suburbs, and these have repercussions for how their residents view the roles of lower and upper levels of government,

the efficacy of their own political participation, and their commitment to regional cooperation. Those living in smaller suburban municipalities in fragmented regions reveal high levels of local participation and efficacy but low levels of trust in regional cooperation or upper levels of government, while the reverse is true for central-city residents. This is partly due to the long history and culture of 'home rule' supported by state constitutional protections (Teaford 1997). Second, racial discrimination on behalf of many suburban municipalities, in the form of direct edicts before the mid-1950s and more indirect methods such as exclusionary zoning afterwards (Danielson 1976; Massey and Denton 1993), worked to severely segregate blacks and the poor in U.S. central cities and allowed the white middle class to flee to the suburbs for the majority of the past century. This led to further political struggles, including those over the school bussing, and these influenced the direction of municipal politics (Clark 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Jonas 1998). Third, municipal governments in the U.S. bear a large responsibility for raising revenue and for the funding of services. For instance, in 1995 U.S. local governments were accountable for raising 31 percent of revenue, and for delivering 48 percent of all public expenditures, more than that accounted for by either the state or federal levels of government (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000, 163). Local responsibilities grew in the face of severe cutbacks in transfers from upper levels of government over the 1980s (Caraley 1992), and the fiscal discrepancies this produced did not decline over the 1990s (Dreier *et al.* 2001). Such a heavy burden on local capacities translates into widely uneven rates of local property taxes, user fees, public service levels and quality of public services such as education (Dreier *et al.* 2001). Thus, it is understandable that the politics of cities and suburbs, particularly as they involve debates about public spending, service levels and schooling would map closely to the boundaries separating central municipalities from their fragmented satellites.

However, it is less clear that sufficient reasons exist for conceiving of zonal distinctions in this way in the Canadian context (or in many European countries for that matter). Regional governments have existed in some form in all of the largest Canadian metropolitan areas (CMAs) for

much of the post-war period, a number of the central cities (particularly in the prairies) cover the vast majority of the urban field, and Canadian levels of fragmentation are considerably lower than in the U.S. (Rothblatt and Sancton 1993; England and Mercer 2006). Although income polarization is clearly evident and growing in Canadian cities (Walks 2001; Ross *et al.* 2004; England and Mercer 2006), levels of ethnic and racial segregation, ghettoization, and city-suburban income inequalities are generally lower in Canadian cities than in their cousins south of the border (Fong 1996; England and Mercer 2006; compare Walks and Bourne 2006 with Johnston *et al.* 2003). Finally, municipal governments in Canada are responsible for a much smaller proportion of total revenue generation and spending than found in the U.S. Between 1948 and 2003, local government spending as a proportion of all government spending in Canada actually dropped from over 18 percent to about 12 percent, and was similar to local governments' responsibilities for revenue generation (Sancton 2006). The existence of regional governments coupled with the lesser burden on local fiscal capacity means that municipal unevenness in property taxation, service levels and/or schooling quality is far lower, and less important for understanding discrepancies within Canadian metropolitan areas.

It is therefore not completely surprising that urban form and lifestyle distinctions should feature more prevalently in Canadian writings on the suburbs (Bourne 1996; Smith 2006). Despite this trend, however, it is still not clear which set of boundary definitions is most appropriate for understanding *political* discrepancies between Canadian cities and suburbs. Although there are good reasons for rejecting the assumption that U.S. patterns of segregation, fragmentation, and fiscal disparities apply in the Canadian context, it also appears that the divisive politics of municipal jockeying within and between regional governments, and more recently of provincial downloading and amalgamations, has tended to sharpen the political distinctions between municipal interests (Keil 2000; Frisken 2001; Donald 2002a, 2002b; Sancton 2006). This distinction is particularly plausible between the 'inner' suburban municipalities that share upper-tier regional governments with their central cities (and/or that have been recently amalgamated with them), and

the 'outer' suburban municipalities that have always held a separate governance identity. The inner and outer suburbs have diverged in terms of age structures, infrastructure deficits, poverty rates, recent immigration flows and neighbourhood trajectories (Walks 2001; Smith 2006). If it is these characteristics that largely define their politics, we might expect to see sharp, and increasing, divergences between inner and outer suburban municipalities. Furthermore, if it is true that decentred growth results in boundaries, rather than cores, being more important for the defining of the social and political identities of post-war suburban municipalities and their residents (Evenden 2000), there is logic in accepting municipal boundaries as the most appropriate for the articulation of Canadian urban residents' political views. Indeed, the Canadian media now commonly debate the influence of 'area-code politics' in federal and provincial elections, referring to the boundary differences between the newly amalgamated cities of Toronto and Montréal (area codes '416' and '514', respectively) and their surrounding suburban ('905' and '450') belts (e.g, Barber 2003). It is even possible that variation in the salience of certain political issues among supporters of the main parties leads to different geographies of support for them, and thus articulated by opposing sets of boundaries in different places and times.[1]

The determination of which zonal definition is more appropriate for understanding intra-urban political differences has theoretical implications. The relevant boundaries reflect the kinds of geographic processes at work, and thus inform

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1 This could occur under either of the transplantation/self-selection or conversion/neighbourhood effects mechanisms. In terms of self-selection, right-leaning voters may move to municipalities with lower service levels and property tax rates, while left-leaning voters might select older neighbourhoods (which could be located anywhere) for aesthetic reasons. Similarly, conversion effects may operate at the level of the municipality in declining central cities where local residents may identify with parties of the left out of solidarity against the perceived oppression of a government elected by suburbanites, or may result from the differences in local experiences, observations, or conversation topics between neighbours, which are driven by considerations of the urban form. These are only some of the many possible reasons why different zonal boundaries may articulate place effects for different political groups (for more detail on the potential mechanisms producing city-suburban political polarization, see Walks 2006).

a theory of how urban *space* might be related to the production of politico-spatial strategies. Under the municipal hypothesis, for instance, transplantation/self-selection processes are assumed rooted in self-interest, racism and/or demographic needs, as in the 'succession of the successful' from higher taxation levels, poor quality services, and/or mixed social/racial environments (Reich 1991). Conversion effects, meanwhile, are assumed to stem from either the move in or out of home ownership, or to a change in social referents resulting from shifts in local social composition (Fischel 2001; Hogen-Esch 2001). In these cases, there is nothing inherent in the spatial *forms* which provoke such responses. Instead, they are related to the political and social benefits bestowed merely by moving residence across jurisdictional boundaries. The latter thus typically act as proxies or containers for other more profound processes and divisions. Even if it is regional politics or centrifugal patterns of suburban development which spur divergence between suburban and inner-city political identities (Evenden 2000; Frisken 2001), such identities would seem produced through political negotiations that may not necessarily or directly pertain to the actual spaces that articulate them.

Urban space plays a more central role in shaping political views under the morphological hypothesis. Transplantation processes invoked through these boundaries, including the self-selection of the new left into Canadian inner cities or of those leaning to the right into U.S. suburbs, are based directly on the symbolic relationship between the aesthetics and urban forms of cities and post-war suburbs and the politics of their implicit lifestyles. Similarly, conversion processes stemming from daily routines and lifestyles (Lefebvre 1991a [org. 1958], 1991b [org. 1974]; Sewell 1991; Goonewardena 2005) assume that urban spatial form plays a mediating role between personal experiences and the production of ideology. Urban space, in this case, is not merely a container concept for other processes occurring at other scales, but acts as a separate identifiable force in the production of political positions. Thus, the boundaries that articulate metropolitan political divergences provide clues as to the types of geographic processes occurring and the nature of the relationship between urban space and politics. As of now, little empirical research has been conducted comparing different boundary definitions for their effects on political dispositions. This article seeks to fill this gap by empirically examining how the two competing zonal models that are discussed above map onto the patterning of city–suburban polarization of the vote in large Canadian cities.

Data and Method

To ascertain whether it is municipal boundaries (the jurisdictional hypothesis) or the boundary based on differences in urban form (the morphological hypothesis) that best describes voting patterns between outer and inner areas of Canadian metropolitan areas, two sets of zonal definitions are constructed for the three largest metropolitan regions in Canada (the Vancouver, Montréal, and Toronto-Hamilton urban regions). These three regions are the only ones in which there are enough constituencies for a long enough period to facilitate their historical classification into one of three zones back to 1945: inner cities, inner suburbs, and outer suburbs.

The jurisdictional definition of the zones is operationalized as the distinction between the 'central' city and all other municipalities within the Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) of the urban regions under study. The central cities under this definition consist of the 'old' (pre-amalgamation) cities of Toronto, Hamilton, Vancouver, and Montréal (the old cities of Westmount and Outremont are also included as 'inner cities' under the municipal definition because they are subsumed within electoral constituencies based in the old City of Montréal). There are two suburban zones. The inner suburbs are defined under this model as those lower-tier municipalities operating within a metropolitan-level upper-tier government alongside their central cities for much of the post-war period (i.e., within Metro Toronto or the Montréal Urban Community), and if this is not the case (as in Vancouver), those municipalities directly contiguous to the 'central city' (New Westminster is also included as inner–suburban in the Vancouver case, due to its age and contiguity with Burnaby). The outer suburbs then consist of all other municipalities remaining in the study CMAs (in the Toronto case, the municipalities in

the Oshawa CMA are also included in the list of outer-suburban municipalities).

The alternative is a functional definition of the zones based on differences in urban form, that is, between the 'old' pre-war city and the 'new' post-war city. Such a definition is operationalized in this research by comparing the extent of development up to, and after, the end of the Second World War, using census data aggregated at the census tract level.[2] Thus, the boundary of the inner city is determined by the outer extent of contiguous development occurring before 1946, while the suburbs constitute the remaining areas of the CMA that were mostly built up after the Second World War. The boundary dividing the inner from the outer suburbs relates to the contiguous extent of development as it was in 1971 (the outer suburban zone thus encompasses not only suburban development completed after 1971 but many exurban and rural areas as well). In some cases the inner cities under this second definition include some older areas lying just beyond the boundary of the central cities, such as parts of York and East York in Toronto, and parts of Verdun, Mont Royal, West Montréal and Hampstead in Montréal. In Vancouver and Hamilton, on the other hand, the inner cities built using this functional definition are significantly smaller than the extents of their central municipalities. Figures 1 to 3 demonstrate, for the greater Montréal, Toronto-Hamilton, and Vancouver regions respectively, how the extent of each zone produced under the morphological definition relates to the municipal boundaries. It should be noted that in the analysis, under both the jurisdictional and morphological definitions these boundaries remain fixed across the study

period. That is, the boundaries do not change from election to election to reflect changes in territory annexed/added to regional governments or shifts in the outer extent of suburban development. The use of fixed boundaries actually has the effect of muting polarizing tendencies over time, since a number of inner suburban areas (which might be classified as outer suburbs under a system of fluid/shifting boundaries) were also locales of radical politics before the 1970s (see Harris 2004, 42). Of course, the use of such fluid/shifting boundaries is impractical here because of the lack of accurate historical data on the extent of suburban development at the time of each election.

To ascertain which set of boundaries is most appropriate for the articulation of city–suburban voting disparities, analysis is undertaken using two separate data sets. First, the aggregate election data for federal elections spanning 1945 to 2000 are analyzed ecologically at the level of the constituency (the only unit for which aggregate election data are available in the entire post-war period). Constituencies are coded depending on which zone they fall into, which varies according to the hypothesis used to define them. An index of zonal imbalance (IZI) is calculated, for each party and in each federal election, using both sets of zonal definitions (jurisdictional versus morphological). This imbalance index produces values between zero and one for each political party. A value of 0 indicates zonal parity in the share of the vote going to a given party (and thus no imbalance), while a value of 1.00 would indicate that 100 percent of the party's vote is found in only one of the zones (the index is calculated as the sum of the absolute differences between each zone's share of the population and its share of vote for the given party, divided by the number of zones, similar to the index of dissimilarity but without its disadvantages).[3]

2 This method provides a rough estimate of the distinction between what are typically seen as urban and suburban land-use patterns. While under ideal conditions it would be preferable to examine land-use designations directly, as yet the methods and resolutions available (using satellite imagery) leave much to be desired and would not likely provide any different information from that using era of development. Similarly, very little is gained from the use of density variables to distinguish between zones. Density gradients within Canadian metropolitan areas are becoming smoother (Filion et al. 2004), with the difference between older inner-city neighbourhoods and their suburban counterparts receding (as many low-density inner-city neighbourhoods have been 'preserved' at the same time that a number of apartment districts have been built in the suburbs).

3 The index of zonal imbalance (IZI) does not suffer from the same drawbacks as the index of dissimilarity (DIS). While boundary changes and differences in the size of the spatial units are a problem for the DIS, the IZI is constructed precisely to *determine* how boundary changes (and the populations defined by them) impact the results. Second, while the DIS is sensitive to the size of the population and the number of spatial units, the IZI is based on analysis of only four spatial units (three zones and the rest of Canada/rest of Québec in the case of the BQ), all with significantly large

Figure 1
Urban zones within the Montréal region

Statistical comparison of the two sets of indices is facilitated by the derivation of a second index (termed here the index of boundary sensitivity, IBS), which demonstrates under which set of boundaries (municipal versus urban form) city–suburban polarization is greatest, and the degree to which switching from one to the other increases or decreases the total amount of zonal imbalance for each party. This IBS is calculated simply as the difference between the IZI values calculated using the municipal boundaries and the IZI values attained when the zones are

population sizes. Third, while use of the DIS is problematic for comparing populations of different sizes and places within different numbers and/or sizes of spatial units, the IZI as employed here compares the very same populations, at the same date, in the same places with the same number of spatial units. Finally, the overall total populations of the zones do not significantly change depending on the definitional model employed.

defined via urban form. In this case a value of zero indicates that the level of city–suburban polarization in a party's vote remains unchanged regardless of the zonal definition used, while values above or below one show the percentage of increase or decrease in the level of city–suburban imbalance associated with a change in the zonal definition (negative values indicate that greater city–suburban polarization is found when municipal boundaries delineate the zones).

Even if it is found that one zonal definition is best at capturing spatial differences in aggregate election returns, this does not mean that such zonal definition is also the most influential at the level of the individual voter. For example, it is likely that much of the city–suburban political polarization uncovered is due to the segregation of individuals and social groups in space based on socio-demographic attributes, and this fact may

Figure 2
Urban zones within the Greater Toronto-Hamilton region

overpower the effect of other geographic mechanisms potentially producing zonal differentiation. If segregation is most salient at one scale (say, between central and suburban municipalities) while other geographic mechanisms are most important at another (for example, between the old and new city forms), a focus on aggregate election data may mean that the effect of processes at one of these scales remains obscured. To determine the appropriate boundaries for articulating city-suburban polarization at the level of the individual voter after controlling for the effects of socio–demographics, data from the 2000 Canada election survey are analyzed. The Canada election survey (CES) is a fully stratified, representative sample of voters collected in waves just before and after each federal election, with systematic over-sampling of smaller provinces in order to provide adequate regional sub-samples. For this analysis, the largest (pre-campaign) wave is analyzed. A total of 3,651 respondents were asked

for whom they planned to vote in the 2000 federal election. Respondents' vote choice (the dependent variable) was then modelled using backwards logistic regression analysis that maximized the likelihood ratio of the entire model, with dummy variables added for urban zone of residence (the independent variable).

First, two sets of models were separately estimated using the two zonal definitions. For this article, place of residence was coded in the CES data based on how respondents' forward sortation areas (FSA) mapped onto the municipal or urban form boundaries. FSAs in urban areas are small geographic units covering on average 26,000 households. The use of FSAs here provides a much more accurate location coding than constituencies, which are often the only geographic units available for electoral research. The models reported are the result of a two-stage logistic regression process. First, two backwards regression models were estimated for each party

Figure 3
Urban zones within the Vancouver region

(the party one intends to vote for is the dependent variable), varying only the urban zone variable definitions (the list of initial control variables and their relevant coding is found in Table 1). Any variable (independent or control) that remained in one of the backwards regression models was then included in the second set of regression models for that party, in order not to bias the effects of urban zone of residence. The same control variables thus appear in each pair of models. Shown here are the odds ratios that result from this second regression estimation. Values above one indicate a greater likelihood of voting for the party in question, while values below one indicate a reduced likelihood. Values above two (indicating 'twice the likelihood') and below 0.50 (indicating 'half the like-

lihood') are usually taken to indicate strong positive and negative effects, respectively. The odds ratios shown for the urban zone variables thus indicate the strength of the effect of place of residence on individual vote choice after controlling for socio-demographics and region. Also, pseudo r^2 statistics are calculated for each model with and without the urban zone variables included. The difference indicates the incremental portion of variance explained by adding urban zone to the models. Differences in the strength of such coefficients between the two models thus indicate the degree to which one set of zonal boundaries outperforms the other in predicting its potential salience to voters.

As a second test, the cores of each of the three zones (those areas that fall under each zonal

Table 1
List of variables included in the regression analysis

Individual-Level Variables	Immigration Status
Gender: *(compared to female)*	*(compared to native born)*
Male	Traditional, English (U.K., U.S.)
Age (years):	Traditional, non-English
16 to 25	Non-traditional immigrant
26 to 35	*(compared to native born and non-recent immigrants)*
36 to 49 (<u>base</u>)	Recent immigrant (previous 15 years)
50 to 65	Ethnicity, Race *(compared to white/European origin)*
65+	Aboriginal
Marriage Status	Black, African, Carribean
Married	East Asian
Cohabit	Eastern European
Other/refused (<u>base</u>)	Italian
Family Status *(compared to 'no kids at home'):*	Portuguese
Kids at home	Latin American
Education	South Asian
Grade 9 or less	Religion
College or technical	Protestant
Bachelor's degree	Catholic
Graduate degree	Jewish religion
All others/refused (<u>base</u>)	No religion
Income	Others/refused/no answer (<u>base</u>)
$19,999/ Y or less	*(compared to not very religious)*
$20,000 to $29,999/ Y	Very religious
$30,000 to $49,999/ Y	*Spatial Variables*
$50,000 to $69,999/ Y	Region (Province) of Residence:
$70,000 to $99,999/ Y	Atlantic
$100,000/ Y or more	Québec
Refused/Don't know (<u>base</u>)	Ontario (<u>base</u>)
Employment/Occupation Status	Prairies (Sask. & Manitoba)
(compared to full-time employee)	Alberta
Self-employed	British Columbia
Unemployed	Urban Place of Residence *(compared to rest of Canada)*
Student	Inner city
Part-time workers	Inner suburb
(compared to non-public sector workers)	Outer suburb
Public sector	Urban Place of Residence (alternate): *(compared to rest of Canada)*
(compared to full-time employee)	Core inner city
Union member	Core inner suburb
Language *(compared to English at home)*	Core outer suburb
French language at home	Pre-2nd World War neighbourhood in inner-suburban municipality
Other language at home	Post-war neigh. in central-city mun.
	Pre-1970 neigh. in outer-suburban mun.
	Post-1970 neigh. in inner-suburban mun.

NOTES: Gender, Family Status, Employment Status, Immigration Status, Race/Ethnicity, Language, Degree of Religiosity, and Urban Place of Residence are coded as simple indicator variables (comparators italicized in parenthesis). Age, Marriage Status, Education, Income, Religion, and Region variables are coded using deviation indicator coding (base variables indicated by underline).

category regardless of the definition used, and thus share neighbourhoods between definitions) are separated out from those neighbourhoods that change zones when the definition is changed (the unshared fragments), of which there are four possibilities (the second set of place-of-residence variables in Table 1). Roughly equal numbers of respondents are found in each of these four neighbourhood/fragment types, which together represent 18 percent of the 1,045 respondents from the three metropolitan regions in the CES, and 5.2 percent of the entire pre-campaign wave. Backwards logistic regression models were then re-estimated with the vote for each federal party

as the dependent variable, but with the place-of-residence variables broken up according to this alternate scheme in order to detect whether any statistically significant independent effects are observed for place of residence in any of the four unshared neighbourhood types.

The Boundaries of City–Suburban Differentiation: Constituency-Level Indices

Regardless of the zonal definition employed, the pattern of zonal imbalance in party support is similar, characterized by increasing polarization after 1974, with particularly unbalanced support for the NDP, Bloc Québécois and Reform/Canadian Alliance parties in the 1990s (Figure 4a, b). With only a few exceptions, across the study period support for the Liberals is more equally balanced than support for the other parties, particularly when municipal boundaries are used to delineate the zones. After 1984 differences between levels of polarization under the municipal and urban form definitions are clearly present for four of the political parties (NDP, Liberals, Reform party and Bloc). In most cases, zones defined using urban form boundaries reveal greater levels of polarization, though the vote for the NDP is more often polarized under the municipal definition.

   These discrepancies in the balance of support for the NDP, Liberals, Reform/Alliance and PC parties between the municipal and urban form definitions pale in contrast with those for the Bloc Québécois. Yet, the significant level of zonal polarization in support for the Bloc Québécois under the morphological definition virtually disappears when municipal boundaries define the zones. This very much reflects the way that the geography of language maps onto the municipal structure of Montréal island, with French speakers disproportionately located on the east side, including much of the old City of Montréal, and English language speakers concentrated in the west island municipalities.[4] Such discrepancies in the

zonal balance for the Bloc between the political and functional definitions of the urban zones are thus partly a statistical artifact of east–west language polarization on Montréal Island itself. This is corroborated by research showing language to be the most important determinant of support for the Bloc Québécois, but not for other parties, in the Montréal region (Walks 2004b, 284).

   Differences in the levels of city–suburban polarization between municipal and urban form zonal definitions are made clearer by changes in the index of boundary sensitivity (Figure 5). This index compares the degree of imbalance under both definitions, and shows the percentage increase (or decrease) associated with the shift from the municipal to the urban form definition. Only for the NDP would the use of municipal boundaries increase the measured level of zonal polarization of the vote, and this only for some post-war federal elections (urban form boundaries are more important in six of the elections, including 1993 and 2000). The weighted average index of boundary sensitivity (the thicker dotted line) reveals also that cities and suburbs are generally more polarized along urban form dimensions than municipal boundaries. This is particularly so in 1993 and 2000 (though the latter is largely due to differences in Bloc Québécois support).

   While functional distinctions based on urban form boundaries would appear more important for understanding polarization of the vote for most parties most of the time, it could also be that the most important places for understanding the production of voter polarization is found not along the boundaries between cities and suburbs, but at the cores of each zone (that is, where both morphological and jurisdictional considerations intersect). Indeed, when all cross-boundary constituencies are removed from the analysis, the

Rivière-des-Prairies which are located at the far east end of Montréal island and which are not contiguous to the rest of the city. When municipal boundaries are used to define the zones, these post-war communities are included in the 'inner city' category (since they are part of the pre-amalgamation City of Montréal), whereas when urban form is used to define the zones, they are classified as (inner) suburban. The opposite largely occurs with the wealthy Anglophone communities of Hampstead, West Montréal, and Mont Royal. These municipalities are classified as inner suburban under the municipal definition, whereas a significant portion of these communities are included as part of the inner city when urban form delineates the zones.

4 The old City of Montréal consisted of significant areas developed in the post-war era, including communities such as Ahuntsic and Sault-aux-Recollet at the north end of the city, as well as the communities of Pointe aux Trembles and

(a): using *municipal boundaries* to define the zones

(b): using *urban form* to define the zones

Figure 4
Index of Zonal Imbalance (IZI), Partisanship 1945–2000
SOURCE: Calculated by the author from Reports of the Electoral Officer of Canada, various years
NOTES: A value of zero suggests zonal parity in support levels (no imbalance), while values of 1.00 indicate complete zonal imbalance

pattern of polarization is equally stark. Figure 6 shows how the zonal balance of party support (designed similarly to Figure 1 in Walks 2004a) would look when all cross-boundary constituencies are excluded (constituencies that would fall into another zone under different definitions are removed), revealing trends for the 'core' constituencies of each zone. These results are also updated to include the 2000 election results. Notably, before 1979, the degree of zonal imbalance is minimal and less than when all constituencies are included (compare with Figure 1, Walks

Figure 5
Index of Boundary Sensitivity, 1945–2000
SOURCE: Calculated by the author from Reports of the Electoral Officer of Canada, various years
NOTES: Index values indicate the degree (in percentage form) to which city–suburban polarization (imbalance) of the vote increases or decreases when the zonal definition changes from one based on municipal boundaries to one based on differences in urban form. Positive values thus indicate that greater city–suburban polarization is found when urban form boundaries delineate the zones, while negative values indicate that greater polarization occurs under zonal definitions based on municipal boundaries. The greater the absolute value (positive or negative) the more sensitive the level of zonal polarization to changes in boundaries. Values closer to zero (0) indicate that polarization levels are less sensitive to boundary changes

2004a). After 1979 there is an immediate and stark increase in the degree of polarization. It is unclear why such a polarized pattern should immediately appear in 1979, though it may be related to the presence of mortgage interest tax deductions as a political issue during the 1979 election campaign and their particular appeal to suburban home owners, having been proposed by then PC leader Joe Clark. Note that when cross-boundary constituencies are removed, the zonal imbalance of Bloc support largely disappears.

Another view of the stark pattern of polarization evident between the 'core' districts of each zone (when all cross-boundary constituencies are removed from the analysis) is provided in Figure 7 (constructed in similar fashion to Figure 2 in Walks 2005, but updated to include the 2000 election and divided into three rather than two zones). This figure presents what is termed the index of ideological leaning, comparing the ratio of votes for the parties on the left (CCF, NDP) and right (SC, PC, Reform, CA) in each zone to the ratio of such votes in the rest of Canada. Yet,

the patterning of zonal polarization in evidence in Figure 7 is not much different than that when all constituencies are included. With the exception of the 1950s when the outer suburbs leaned to the right of the other two zones (when they had for the most part yet to be developed as commuter suburbs), all three urban zones show a remarkably similar mix of votes up until the dual elections of 1979 and 1980, after which the inner cities slowly shift back to a place approximately as 'left' as their mix of votes in the 1960s, whereas the inner suburbs stay close to the leaning of the rest of Canada and the outer suburbs shift relatively to the 'right'.

The Bounding of Partisanship at the Level of the Individual

While the above results are suggestive, it remains unclear from the aggregate analysis just how important the zonal definitions are for delineating place effects in federal elections. Of

Figure 6
City–suburban balance of party support, removing all cross-boundary constituencies, 1945–2000
SOURCE: Calculated by the author from Reports of the Electoral Officer of Canada, various years
NOTES: Index values indicate the ratio between suburban and inner-city vote shares for each party. The index is calculated as the ratio of the proportion voting for the political party in the suburbs to the ratio of the proportion voting for the political party in the inner city (or, index = (Party Vote % Suburbs/Party Vote % Inner Cities) *100). Values above 100 indicate that the party in question received greater support from the suburbs, while values below 100 indicate the party received greater support from the inner cities. A value of 100 indicates parity between suburban and inner-city vote shares. For this figure, all constituencies straddling zonal boundaries (that would fall into another zone if the zonal definition were changed) have been removed. The results thus show the zonal balance of party preferences in the 'cores' of each zone

course, the aggregate data by definition cannot tell us about individual voting behaviour. It may be that the findings presented thus far, which point to urban form boundaries as being more important for the articulation of city–suburban differentiation, are a statistical artifact of the location of constituency boundaries and/or are the result of the segregation of different social groups in space. In order to test for such effects, the 2000 Canada election survey (CES) data are analyzed via the estimation of logistic regression models (in similar fashion to Walks 2004b) but with place of residence coded using the much finer scale *forward sortation area* (FSA) units, rather than constituencies. This allows for a much closer mapping of residents' locations to both the municipal boundaries and urban form considerations. To provide comparative analysis at the smaller metropolitan scale, separate logistic regression models were also estimated for each of the three urban regions under study.

While the direction of the results is similar, after controlling for individual-level socio-demographics, the residential zone variables defined using urban form boundaries clearly outperform those defined jurisdictionally (Table 2). Zone effects are only in evidence for those parties farther to the left and right (the NDP and CA, respectively), and not for the two parties traditionally vying for power—the Liberals and PCs (of course, the latter is no longer in existence, having merged with the Canadian Alliance in 2003). Under both definitions, inner-city residents are much more likely to vote NDP, and about half as likely to vote CA, while outer-suburban residents are also half as likely to vote NDP and inner-suburban residents are less likely to vote CA. Yet, the coefficients for the urban zone are stronger and more significant when urban form is used to define the zones. Most notably, inner-city residents are just over two and a half times more likely to vote

Figure 7
Index of ideological leaning, removing all cross-boundary constituencies
SOURCE: Calculated by the author from Reports of the Electoral Officer of Canada, various years
NOTES: Index values represent the ideological leaning as represented by the mix of party votes in each zone as compared with the mix of party votes in the rest of Canada. It is calculated as the ratio of the vote shares between right (Progressive Conservative, Social Credit, Reform and Canadian Alliance parties) and left-wing political parties (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and New Democratic Party) in each zone, compared to the ratio of vote shares between right and left wing political parties in the 'rest of Canada' (index = (Urban Zone RW%/LW%)/(Rest-of-Canada RW%/LW%) *100). A ratio of 100 indicates parity between the ideological leaning (mix of right-wing and left-wing votes) between a particular urban zone and the rest of Canada. Results above 100 indicate that the urban zone leans toward political parties of the right more than does the rest of Canada, while results below 100 indicate that the urban zone leans more towards parties of the left than does the rest of Canada. For this figure, all constituencies along zonal boundaries, which are contested (that would fall into another zone if the zonal definition were changed), have been removed. The results thus show the index of ideological leaning of the 'cores' of each zone

NDP when the zone is defined jurisdictionally, but over three and a half times more likely to vote for the party when urban zone is defined morphologically (controlling for region and socio-demographics). Similarly, the proportion of variation in support for the NDP and CA that can be explained by both the full model and separately by the urban zone variables (r^2) is higher when place of residence is defined morphologically. The curious apparent discrepancy among NDP supporters between the aggregate electoral analysis (where in a number of years, though it must be noted, not in 2000, a higher level of city–suburban polarization was discerned by the IBS when municipal boundaries defined the zones) and the individual 2000 survey results (which reveal stronger place effects on the vote using urban form boundaries) can be understood in relation to the greater concentration of the

social groups that traditionally support the party—union members, young singles, students, those with below-average education—within the central cities where rental housing has in the past been cheaper and more accessible. It is after controlling for these variables that place effects are discerned (in this case, the greater effect of place on NDP support when urban form boundaries define the zones).

Zonal political polarization, and the relative importance of urban form for articulating it, is similarly revealed to operate at the metropolitan scale (when each study region is analyzed separately), though the patterns of polarization are expressed differently in Ontario (Table 3), Québec (Table 4) and Vancouver (Table 5). It is the vote for the NDP and CA parties that is most polarized in each study region. In Ontario and Québec, inner-city residents were more likely to

Table 2
The predictors of the vote for each party (odds ratios) in the 2000 federal election (all of Canada)

Variables		Municipal boundaries				Urban form boundaries			
		NDP	LIB	PC	CA	NDP	LIB	PC	CA
Gender—male				*0.712	***2.184			*0.712	***2.196
Age	15 to 24			*0.727				*0.727	
	25 to 35	0.759				0.761			
	50 to 65	*1.343				*1.336			
	65+			1.181				1.181	
Family status									
	Married	***0.652			***1.282	***0.656			***1.285
Education	Education < Grade 9	0.732		*0.773		0.745		*0.773	
	Education—College		*0.865		**1.220		*0.865		**1.218
	Education—Bach. deg.		**1.193	*1.282			**1.193	*1.282	
	Education—Grad. deg.	**1.748				**1.680			
Income									
	$20–29,999				**0.677				**0.680
	$100,000+			*1.458				*1.458	
Language	French at home		***0.464				***0.464		
	Other at home				1.448				1.425
Immigration status									
	Non-traditional		*1.277		*0.613		*1.277		*0.590
	Recent (prev. 15 years)								
Ethnicity	South Asian		2.234	<0.001	0.150		2.234	<0.001	0.148
	Black-Caribbean		**3.498		0.237		**3.498		0.222
	East Asian	<0.001	*1.984		0.480	<0.001	*1.984		0.455
	Aboriginal				0.345				0.338
Employment status									
	Self-employed				1.252				1.253
	Student	**2.079				**2.075			
	Public sector								
	Union member	**1.590			0.849	**1.580			0.854
Religion	Protestant			**1.548	***2.027			**1.548	***2.009
	Catholic		***1.726		*0.755		***1.726		*0.751
	No religion	***3.242				***3.188			
	Very religious				**1.365				**1.368
Region	Atlantic	***2.742		***3.734	***0.296	***2.807		***3.734	***0.297
	Québec	*0.231		***0.420	***0.300	***0.226		***0.420	***0.297
	Prairies (Manitoba & Sask.)	***2.832			*1.322	***2.914			*1.323
	Alberta	*0.569	***0.631		***3.821	*0.588	***0.631		***3.830
	BC			**0.556	***2.258			**0.556	***2.262
Urban zone	Inner cities	***2.684			*0.534	***3.633			**0.448
	Inner suburbs				*0.591				*0.692
	Outer suburbs	*0.506				*0.492			
Constant		***0.428	***0.349	***0.059	***0.116	***0.042	***0.349	***0.059	***0.116
−2 ∗ Log likelihood		1,312.2	4,232.2	1,614.8	2,563.9	1,301.0	4,232.2	1,614.8	2,562.9
Cox and Snell R^2		0.062	0.049	0.047	0.173	0.064	0.049	0.047	0.173
Nagelkerke R^2		0.179	0.070	0.122	0.292	0.187	0.070	0.122	0.293
Nagelkerke R^2 urban zone only		0.019	na	na	0.153	0.027	na	na	0.154
Percentage predicted correctly		94.5%	71.5%	93.3%	85.6%	94.6%	71.5%	93.3%	85.7%

NOTES: Coefficients are the odds ratios (>1.00 = more likely to vote for the party, <1.00 = less likely) resulting from a two-step process. First, separate backwards regression models were estimated for each political party using both urban zonal definitions. Then, the models were re-run with all the variables that stayed in either of these two models included in the current model. The result is that the same variables are included in both models (municipal and urban form). Sig. = $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$.

Table 3
The predictors of the vote for each party (odds ratios) in the 2000 federal election, ONTARIO only

Variables		Municipal boundaries				Urban form boundaries			
		NDP	LIB	PC	CA	NDP	LIB	PC	CA
Gender—male					***2.168				***2.192
Age	15 to 24		*0.752	***0.232			*0.752	***0.222	
	50 to 65			*1.700				*1.753	
Family status									
	Married			*0.710				*0.707	
Education									
	Education—Bach. deg.				0.742				0.750
	Education— Grad. deg.	1.482			1.471	1.512			1.478
Income	<$20,000				*0.500				*0.500
	$50–69,999		*0.702		1.413		*0.702		1.423
	$100,000+			***2.691				***2.687	
Language									
	French at home			<0.001				<0.001	
Immigration status									
	Non-traditional immigrants			*1.906				*2.056	
	Recent (prev. 15 years)				0.141				0.138
Ethnicity									
	South Asian			<0.001				<0.001	
	Black–Caribbean		2.978	<0.001			2.978	<0.001	
	East Asian	<0.001	*2.694			<0.001	*2.694		
	Italian				0.165				0.165
Employment status									
	Self-employed				**1.999				**1.999
	Unemployed		*0.470				*0.470		
	Student	*2.656	*2.288			*2.906	*2.288		
	Public sector	*1.980				*2.006			
Religion	Protestant			*1.973	***1.851			*1.975	***1.851
	Catholic		***1.803				***1.803		
	No-religion	***6.168				***6.248			
	Very religious				**1.610				***1.610
Urban zone	Inner cities	***4.446			0.481	***5.317			*0.420
	Inner suburbs	*3.372				*2.592			
	Outer suburbs	0.504		0.489		0.318		0.538	
Constant		***0.022	***0.533	***0.036	***0.089	***0.022	***0.533	***0.035	***0.089
−2 * Log likelihood		351.5	1,283.3	472.2	863.1	346.9	1,283.3	470.4	863.1
Cox and Snell R^2		0.071	0.045	0.053	0.069	0.075	0.045	0.054	0.069
Nagelkerke R^2		0.203	0.061	0.126	0.112	0.215	0.061	0.131	0.112
Nagelkerke R^2—urban zone only		0.064	na	0.003	0.007	0.077	Na	0.007	0.011
Percentage predicted correctly		94.2%	66.3%	92.4%	81.9%	94.2%	66.3%	92.4%	81.9%

NOTES: Coefficients are the odds ratios (>1.00 = more likely to vote for the party, <1.00 = less likely) resulting from a two-step process. First, separate backwards regression models were estimated for each political party using both urban zonal definitions. Then, the models were re-run with all the variables that stayed in either of these two models included in the current model. The result is that the same variables are included in both models (municipal and urban form). Sig. = *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

vote NDP and less likely to support the CA, while the outer suburbs of greater Toronto-Hamilton and Vancouver were less likely to vote NDP, and in the latter were more than twice as likely to vote CA as their provincial counterparts. Smaller effects were found for the PC party in Ontario (where outer-suburban residents were no-tably less likely than Ontarians from outside the region to support the party, though these results are not statistically significant), and the Liberals in BC (both inner-city and inner-suburban residents were more likely than residents living elsewhere in BC to vote Liberal). In all cases (except the insignificant PC party results in Ontario)

Table 4
The predictors of the vote for each party (odds ratios) in the 2000 federal election, Québec only

Variables		Municipal boundaries					Urban form boundaries				
		NDP	LIB	PC	CA	BQ	NDP	LIB	PC	CA	BQ
Gender—male						*1.355					*1.355
Age	15 to 24					**1.451					**1.451
	25 to 35					1.265					1.265
	50 to 65					0.770					0.770
	65+		**1.399		*1.694	***0.584		**1.399		*1.687	***0.584
Family status	Married				1.448					1.448	
Education	Education < Grade 9	0.494		*4.074			*0.393		*4.074		
	Education—College.				1.378					1.446	
	Education—Bach. deg.			*4.532					*4.532		
	Education—Grad. deg.			*0.032					*0.032		
Income	<$20,000	*4.627		0.322		*0.770	*6.019		0.322		*0.770
	$100,000+	*0.056		*2.966		***1.419	*0.046		*2.966		***1.419
Language	French at home		***0.343		***6.983	***6.983		***0.343		***6.983	***6.983
Immigration status	Non-traditional		*1.539					*1.539			
Ethnicity	Italian	**48.070			*6.392		**41.788			*5.874	
	Portuguese					<0.001					<0.001
Employment status	Unemployed										
	Public sector		0.526					0.526			
	Union member	*2.746		2.116	1.779		*2.886		1.766	1.766	
Religion	Catholic										
	No religion	**0.206			2.308		*0.240			*2.544	
Urban zone	Inner cities	**5.617			0.397		***10.435			0.161	
	Inner suburbs		***0.195					***0.195			
	Outer suburbs										
Constant		***0.011	0.757	***0.008	***0.033	***0.057	***0.007	0.757	***0.008	***0.033	***0.057
−2 * Log likelihood		140.4	1,263.9	260.5	385.4	1,369.4	134.3	1,263.9	260.5	382.7	1,369.4
Cox and Snell R²		0.031	0.055	0.017	0.017	0.078	0.036	0.055	0.017	0.019	0.078
Nagelkerke R²		0.232	0.084	0.088	0.062	0.113	0.267	0.084	0.088	0.069	0.113
Nagelkerke R²—urban zone only		0.055	na	na	0.008	na	0.091	na	na	0.016	na
Percentage predicted correctly		98.4%	77.9%	97.6%	96.2%	72.6%	98.7%	77.9%	97.6%	96.2%	72.6%

NOTES: Coefficients are the odds ratios (>1.00 = more likely to vote for the party, <1.00 = less likely) resulting from a two-step process. First, separate backwards regression models were estimated for each political party using both urban zonal definitions. Then, the models were re-run with all the variables that stayed in either of these two models included in the current model. The result is that the same variables are included in both models (municipal and urban form). Sig. = *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

Table 5
The predictors of the vote for each party (odds ratios) in the 2000 federal election, British Columbia only

Variables		Municipal boundaries				Urban form boundaries			
		NDP	LIB	PC	CA	NDP	LIB	PC	CA
Gender—male				0.327	**1.887			0.327	**1.900
Age	25 to 35	*0.377	*1.667			*0.399	*1.734		
	65+	*2.284	*0.577		1.356	*2.161	*0.567		1.411
Family status									
	Married	*0.574			**1.605	*0.581			**1.665
Education	Education < Grade 9								
	Education—College		*0.678				0.702		
	Education—Bach. deg.		*1.662				*1.618		
	Education—Grad. deg.				1.506				1.525
Income	<$20,000			*4.429	*0.148			*4.429	*0.143
	$40–59,999	*2.501		0.179		*2.613		0.179	
	>$100,000				1.646				1.788
Language									
	Other at home		1.322	<0.001			1.355	<0.001	
Immigration status									
	Recent (Prev. 15 years)				*6.522				*9.881
Ethnicity	South Asian		1.933		<0.001		1.943		<0.001
	East European	<0.001			2.571	<0.001			2.805
	Aboriginal	*8.605				*9.870			
Employment status									
	Self-employed	*2.517		<0.001		*2.333		<0.001	
Religion	Protestant				***2.977				***2.828
	Very religious	*0.135			1.694	*0.130			*1.908
Urban zone	**Inner cities**		**1.932**				***2.158**		
	Inner suburbs		****2.651**		***0.244**		****3.061**		***0.226**
	Outer suburbs	**0.437**			***1.982**	**0.262**			***2.135**
Constant		***0.089	***0.364	***0.087	***0.143	***0.095	***0.354	***0.087	***0.138
−2 * Log likelihood		178.0	440.4	107.9	381.6	175.9	437.5	107.9	381.6
Cox and Snell R^2		0.092	0.065	0.047	0.213	0.097	0.073	0.047	0.216
Nagelkerke R^2		0.213	0.092	0.168	0.298	0.226	0.104	0.168	0.305
Nagelkerke R^2—urban zone only		0.035	0.033	na	0.046	0.047	0.045	na	0.052
Percentage predicted correctly		92.3%	70.8%	96.1%	74.5%	92.4%	71.4%	96.1%	76.4%

NOTES: Coefficients are the odds ratios (>1.00 = more likely to vote for the party, <1.00 = less likely) resulting from a two-step process. First, separate backwards regression models were estimated for each political party using both urban zonal definitions. Then, the models were re-run with all the variables that stayed in either of these two models included in the current model. The result is that the same variables are included in both models (municipal and urban form). Sig. = *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

the coefficients (and r^2) for the urban zone are stronger and statistically more significant when defined in relation to urban form, providing further support at smaller scales of analysis for the morphological hypothesis. Zone of residence under the latter definition explains a greater proportion of the variation in party preferences (by an additional 0.1 to 3.5 percent, depending on the party and the urban region analysed) than under the municipal definition. Notably, no residual place effects were uncovered for the Bloc using either zonal definition once individual-level variables were controlled for, language being the most important predictor.

Although the coefficients are generally stronger and more significant under morphological definitions of place, due to the small numbers of respondents in the CES at *no* time are the confidence intervals for the two competing models (in any of Tables 2–5) mutually exclusive at the 95 percent level (confidence intervals are not shown). Because these confidence intervals

overlap, we cannot be confident using this methodology that the coefficients attained via the morphological model are significantly different from the coefficients attained from the models with the zones defined jurisdictionally. It could be, for instance, that only the *interaction* between urban form and municipal autonomy creates the political polarization observed above, with variation at the fringes of the 'cores' of each zone merely providing statistical noise. Such a possibility is also compatible with the patterns observed in Figures 6 and 7.

To investigate this question, a second set of logistic regression models was estimated with the shared cores of each zone (those areas that do not change zonal designations between the competing models) separated out from the unshared fragments (those areas that fall into different zonal categories depending on the definition), of which there are four possible types: pre–Second World War neighbourhoods within inner-suburban municipalities, post-war neighbourhoods within central-city municipalities, pre-1970 neighbourhoods within outer-suburban municipalities, and post-1970 neighbourhoods within inner-suburban municipalities. The results for electoral partisanship using this alternate method are presented in Table 6. Strong statistically significant coefficients are attained for each of the core zonal variables. Residents of the 'core' of the inner cities are almost four times more likely to vote for NDP, and only half as likely to vote CA, as those living elsewhere in Canada, while the residents of core inner-suburban areas were one and a half times more likely to vote Liberal, and residents of the core outer-suburbs less than half as likely to vote NDP.

The results for the contested areas (where zonal affiliation is in question) support the morphological hypothesis. Importantly, those living in pre-war areas in suburban municipalities contiguous to the central city vote more like their core inner-city counterparts than those in other suburban areas, while residents of post-war areas located within the boundaries of the central city vote more alike those living in post-war suburban municipalities. Similarly, post-1970 areas within inner-suburban municipalities reveal voting patterns more in line with their counterparts farther out, and early post-war neighbourhoods located in outer-suburban municipalities have propensi-

ties more similar to those in the core inner suburbs. Of these results, the only coefficients that are statistically significant are those for the residents of pre-war neighbourhoods in suburban municipalities, who were found to be even *more* likely to vote NDP, and even *less* likely to support the CA party, than were core inner-city residents. This provides confirmation at and above the 95 percent confidence level that place effects on voting intentions as uncovered in the 2000 federal election are largely rooted in morphologically, rather than jurisdictionally, articulated mechanisms, at least when the difference between the inner city and the suburbs is considered. The lack of statistically significant results for those living in neighbourhoods on the borders between the inner and outer suburbs suggests that this distinction is less meaningful, at least for understanding electoral neighbourhood effects. This is what we might expect if the meaning of the 'suburbs' is understood in terms of distinct lifestyles, rather than jurisdictional interests.

Discussion: The Boundaries of Place Effects

This article has examined and compared two competing hypotheses concerning the articulation of intra-urban political discrepancies and sought to establish which one best fits the pattern of city–suburban political polarization evidenced in Canada's three largest urban regions over the post-war period. Examination of both aggregate-level election results, and individual-level survey responses from the 2000 Canada election survey, show similar patterns of city–suburban polarization regardless of the zonal definitions employed, in part because it is the core of each zone rather than their border regions (which are numerically much smaller) that largely determine their political trajectories. Nonetheless, analysis of the aggregate election data, and of the individual-level survey data at multiple scales, all confirm that morphological rather than jurisdictional distinctions are more important for understanding place effects on voting behaviour among metropolitan dwellers in the Canadian context.

Most significantly, the residents of neighbourhoods that were built up before the Second World War, but located outside of the central cities,

Table 6

The predictors of the vote for each party (odds ratios) in the 2000 federal election, parsing core and border regions within each zone

Variables		NDP	Liberal	PC	CA	BQ
Gender—male				*0.708	***2.232	*1.369
Age	15 to 24					*1.146
	25 to 35	0.758				
	50 to 65	*1.336				
	65+					**0.613
Family status	Married	***0.657			***1.264	0.851
Education	Education < Grade 9	0.747		0.792		**0.731
	Education—College		*0.866			
	Education—Bach. deg.		*1.178	1.269		
	Education—Grad. deg.	**1.681				
Income	<$20,000					
	$20–29,999				*0.705	
	$100,000+			*1.491		
Language						
	French at home		***0.454			***0.647
Immigration status						
	English-speaking					0.172
	Non-traditional				*0.625	
Ethnicity	South Asian		*2.432		0.171	
	Black-Caribbean		**4.090		0.228	
	Italian					<0.001
	East Asian	<0.001	**2.127			
	Aboriginal				0.368	
Employment status						
	Self-employed				*1.324	
	Student	**2.087				
	Union member	**1.604				
Religion	Protestant			**1.591	***2.008	
	Catholic		***1.740		*0.750	
	No religion	***3.194				
	Very religious				**1.393	0.708
Region	Atlantic	***2.878		***3.754	***0.299	Na
	Québec	***0.222		***0.480	***0.301	Na
	Prairies (Manitoba & Sask.)	***2.981		0.640	*1.328	Na
	Alberta		***0.639		***3.887	Na
	BC			0.685	***2.181	Na
Shared zone	**Core—Inner cities**	*** *3.931*	1.237	0.702	* *0.522*	0.670
(Mun ∩ urban form)	**Core—Inner suburbs**	1.738	* *1.502*	0.851	0.664	1.097
	Core—Outer suburbs	* *0.496*	0.959	0.716	1.135	1.104
Unshared	**Pre-War in inner suburban mun.**	*** *5.178*	1.409	1.842	* *0.172*	0.979
Zonal	**Post-War in inner city mun.**	0.247	1.045	1.229	0.431	0.689
Fragments	**Post-1970 in inner suburban mun.**	0.652	1.022	1.141	0.987	0.554
	Pre-1970 in outer suburban mun.	1.480	1.497	0.130	0.556	1.412
Constant		***0.040	***0.346	***0.062	***0.105	***0.067
−2 * Log likelihood		1,294.8	4,225.4	1,608.1	2,567.6	1,358.2
Cox and Snell R^2		0.066	0.051	0.049	0.172	0.086
Nagelkerke R^2		0.192	0.072	0.126	0.291	0.124
Percentage predicted correctly		94.5%	71.4%	93.3%	86.7%	73.6%

NOTES: Coefficients are the odds ratios resulting from a two-stage stepwise regression. First, backwards regression models were estimated without the zonal variables present, in order to determine those control variables most pertinent to explaining vote choice for each party. Then the zonal variables were included in a second set of regression models, the results of which are shown above.

Sig. = $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. Bloc support analyzed for Québec only.

reveal party preferences that match very closely those in older neighbourhoods found within the central cities. The morphological and jurisdictional models are only statistically significantly distinct in relation to the boundary between the inner city and the (inner) suburbs in 2000, and only for the NDP and CA parties. Neighbourhood effects, and the boundaries that articulate them, would thus appear most consistently important for understanding voter 'discontent' among residents of older neighbourhoods in proximity to the urban core. Place effects on suburban voters reveal less consistency across the three study regions, and the boundaries that divide the inner from outer suburbs remain fuzzy, though the cores of each suburban zone do reveal distinct proclivities, particularly an aversion to the NDP in the outer suburbs (in British Columbia residence in the outer suburbs is also independently associated with disproportionate support for the Canadian Alliance).

While the nature of the study and the data examined are such that firm causal relationships cannot be proven, nor were they sought (for this, see Walks 2006), the finding that urban form is more important for understanding the political positions of metropolitan Canadians nonetheless is consistent with the contention that the mechanisms producing city–suburban polarization are more related to lifestyle, everyday life, self-identity and self-expression, rather than to individual or household material interests based on service or taxation levels, schooling quality, or racial segregation (as assumed for the U.S. under the jurisdictional hypothesis). Such results accord with the finding uncovered in Toronto at a much smaller scale that self-selection, particularly of middle-class NDP supporters into older pre-war neighbourhoods but also of right-leaning residents into 'the suburbs' (defined by lifestyle), is the mechanism best explaining geographic discrepancies in party preferences, followed in strength by the effects of local experiences which appear to be influenced by how urban form structures everyday life (Walks 2006).

In turn, these findings provide further support at both the aggregate and individual levels for the proposition that urban spatial form plays a somewhat more direct role in the mediation of political culture, behaviour, values and ideology (Lefebvre 1991a [org. 1958], 1991b [org. 1974], 2003 [org. 1974]; Goonewardena 2005), instead of merely acting as an empty container for processes occurring at other scales of analysis, as in the jurisdictional model (Saunders 1986). Importantly, if the primary mechanisms producing zonal polarization are self-selection based on the aesthetic qualities of inner-city and suburban neighbourhoods, and local experiences that are themselves dependent upon the built form (Walks 2006), then this posits urban space and place not only as a location where social relations are negotiated, but as a central element in the establishment and maintenance of class habitus, consciousness, and distinction, particularly among fractions of the (new) middle classes (Thrift 1987; Bridge 2001). Furthermore, it suggests a complex dialectical relationship between urban morphology and political identity, as the self-selection of particular groups into different neighbourhoods out of a preference for certain types of aesthetic and environmental qualities helps to transform the neighbourhood ambiance, as well as the underlying social structure, and these changes in turn feed back on the range of potential local experiences in such places (Walks forthcoming).

Of course, it may be somewhat disingenuous to disentangle the effects of municipal policy from lifestyle choices, urban aesthetics, everyday life, and self-identity, being as they are historically evolved from, and subsequently mediated through, the development of institutions such as land-use planning, local tax regimes, and the spatial division of labour. For instance, the work of Slater (2004) and Rose (2004) on the policy contexts surrounding gentrification within Toronto and Montréal, and of Cowen (2005) in relation to municipal policies in the suburbs of Toronto, suggest a reflexive relationship between class interests, self-expression and municipal efforts at accommodation. Also, it may be that if Canadian cities were more fragmented with a more uneven pattern of education quality, municipal taxation, racial settlement, and service levels, jurisdictional differences might then trump the more subtle variations based on urban spatial form that have been uncovered here. If the neo-liberal restructuring and rescaling of municipal governance continues (and with it, fiscal crises related to the downloading of responsibility for revenue collection and service delivery to local governments), and

if municipalities are then forced to compete further (for upper-income households, high-end retail and office development, etc.) the patterns of political division may begin to resemble the U.S. model based on municipal fragmentation. These findings, nonetheless, contribute to a Canadian perspective on the boundaries of the relationship between place of residence and political values.

Acknowledgements

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