GLOBALIZING CITIES

A NEW SPATIAL ORDER?

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Conclusion: A Changed Spatial Order

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In this concluding essay, we begin by describing the changes that we have found in the spatial order of cities, both from the pieces in this volume and from our own other work and analyses.[1] They fall into three areas:

- strengthened structural spatial divisions with increased inequality among them and increasing walling between each;
- specific new (in prevalence and depth) spatial formations within these structural divisions; and
- a set of "soft" locations in which change is taking place.

We then explore some frequently used terms in the globalization discussion, and challenge some generalizations about them:

- American exceptionalism
- globalization
- global cities
- globalizing cities

Thinking back over our collective work, we then express some cautions about the state of our knowledge and some limitations of a too rigid approach to comparative studies, pushing generalizations in the face of multiple contingencies. Specifically, we are concerned with:

- the limitations of spatial analysis of societal change
- the necessity of seeing the different dimensions of the layered city; and
- the multiple contingencies in the comparative analysis.

We conclude by presenting our present view of the answer to the question: "is there a new spatial order of cities," with a final comment on the policy implications of our analysis.

The Changed Spatial Pattern

Strengthened structural spatial divisions

The concept of divisions underlies a great deal of recent discussions of urban development. We referred in the Introduction to the literature on divided cities, dual cities, quartered cities, fragmented cities. While they differ in their descriptions of the number of parts into which the city is divided and the nature of those parts, the contributions in this book support (although with significant variations) the conclusion that division is increasing, and that there is something at least worth serious concern in the extent of that increase. Hence our conclusion that the nature and extent of divisions are one clear indicator, at the most basic level, of what is happening to cities under the influence of globalization.

Cities have always shown functional, cultural and status divisions, but the differentiation between areas has grown and lines between the areas have hardened, sometimes literally in the form of walls that function to protect the rich from the poor. What is more: the relation between these stronger spatial differentiation is a double one. On the one hand, walls, literal or symbolic, prevent people from seeing, meeting and hearing each other; at the extremes, they insulate and they exclude. Contact across the walls is minimal, and if it takes places, business-like and commodified.

On the other hand, within the walls life can be lived in its totality: places of residence, of work, of recreation, of socialization, are increasingly available within the walls themselves, whether it be the citadel, the edge city, or the excluded ghetto. The quarters of the city become *totalized*. Everyday life can be reasonably conducted within the quarter itself, and the necessity – and the opportunity – for external contact is steadily diminished.

The divisions of space are not only the product of divisions in society; they help to create those divisions. Those within the walls of the upper quarters decide for the others what will happen in the spheres of economic activity, government, and to an increasing extent cultural and social life.. Partially out of self-interest and partially simply because they do not see, meet and hear the others, decisions painful to others are easily made. Goldsmith has

indicated this process very well in his chapter: following Sennett (1970) he states that where those in power have to rely on television and other media for knowledge of those below, we might end up in a situation in which opinions are only formed by stereotypes and decisions are made on the basis of uninformed preconceptions.

Structural economic and political change produces both extreme wealth and extreme poverty, concentrated power and concentrated powerlessness, ghettoization and citadelization, and not by accident: the decrease at the one end is in large part the result of the increase at the other. The distribution of power, and to an important extent of wealth, inevitably has winners and losers. And changes at both ends have major impacts on the life-worlds of those in between, the various segments of the "middle class." Isolation from the unlike and homogenization with the like, essentially two faces of the same development, physically as well as culturally, become prevalent in all quarters.

So the changing spatial order of cities exhibits two characteristics: divisions between quarters, with each quarter more and more cut off from its surroundings, and a totalizing trend, in which each quarter more and more internalizes within its boundaries all of the necessities of life. But each characteristic represents trends manifest well before the period of globalization, and is represented in cities in various relationships to globalization. Whether the scale of change, clearly accelerated if not caused by globalization, is sufficient to call the result a new spatial order is a judgment call. Our conclusion is that it is not.

Nor is the definition of the structural components of the city radically different from what it had been in earlier periods, over the last hundred if not two hundred years. It is not a two-part division, with partitions, walls, between those two only. In sophisticated discussions, such as those around the "two-thirds society" in Germany, the two-part division has a direct political import: it is between those doing well and those doing poorly, those benefiting and those paying, the winners and the losers. It has real value in pointing out that there are indeed losers as well as winners in the process of economic advance, of challenging the notions of unitary societies (or unitary cities) in which all sink or all swim together. But it also has real dangers, not only in the suggestion that the majority is doing well, and thus change is unlikely, but also in eliding the substantial differences among those who are indeed doing well at any given time, but in quite different fashion, with different vulnerabilities, different disadvantages, different roles, and perhaps different interests in change. It further underplays the differences among those who are not doing well, differences often (particularly when accompanied by "racial" or ethnic differences) dividing the lower one-third not only from the upper two-thirds but also from each other.

The more complex divisions suggested in earlier work (Marcuse, 1989), based on the quartered city analysis, holds up in general based on the

presentations in this book, but only in general. It is sharpest at the extremes, with the partitions between the excluded ghetto and the rest of the city and between the luxury city and the rest of the city. Ask any resident where the most impoverished ethnic or "racial" minority live in any globalizing city (we take up the definition of "globalizing" below), and they will tell you; likewise, they will tell you where the very rich and very powerful live and work. But the likelihood of human contact with others outside the excluded ghetto or the luxury city by their residents, across the lines separating them spatially, is small – contact other than in a temporally limited and purely functional way, e.g. as servants to the rich or beggars seeking charity.

Social contact across class lines has always been limited, of course; what is different today is the sharpness of the spatial boundaries inhibiting such contact, the extent of the concentration by class within those boundaries. For the luxury city, the boundaries, sometimes collective as in gated communities or citadels, sometimes in separate free-standing high-rise buildings, are physical: entrance is barred to those having no business there. For the excluded ghetto, its boundaries are known and maintained, for outsiders by the perception of danger, for insiders by the multiple forms of discrimination encountered on the outside and the triage practiced on the inside.

Other quarters, however, while showing increased clustering and more perceptible boundaries, are still more fluid in their composition, their boundaries more permeable and more elastic. Thus technical experts and professionals, although not in decision-making roles, may be spatially close to those who do make decisions, certainly by day, to some extent by night (hence the reference to the "layered city," below). Suburban middle-class areas house better-earning factory or construction workers as well as small-business people and many professionals. The market segregates by price, as it always did, and while the lines of separation may be clearer, with no need for crude redlining to enforce them, the underlying pattern of differentiation is the same.

The resulting pattern, in structural terms, is not so different from what it was in earlier periods. Change lies rather (in addition to changes in the lines between them, discussed above) within the components of that structure.

New socio-spatial formations within the divisions

Rather than structural change in the basis of divisions, what has become clear to us as we have worked on this book is that there are formations within each of these quarters of the city that are indeed new – new, not in the sense of without precedent, but new in that their prevalence, their prominence, their magnitude, put together justify calling them new. There are three ways of looking at the impact of macro-societal factors on the internal spatial structure of cities. One is at the structural level: on a macro basis, to try to generalize from macro forces, and formulate a set of broad spatial patterns

that will be more or less congruent to broad societal patterns. The literature using such concepts as dual city, divided city, fragmented city, is in this vein; the quartered city formulation we used in the Introduction is an explicit effort in this direction (see, e.g., Marcuse, 1989; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991, last chapter). A second way is to begin at the opposite end, the level of places: it is the most concrete, and would look at the particular types of space most likely to be affected by macro forces and generalize from there: to look at waterfronts, for instance, or old industrial sites. Several of the contributors to this book give persuasive evidence of what can and cannot be learned from such changed an approach, and we use it in the discussion of "soft" locations below. In this Conclusion, however, we attempt an intermediate approach, at what might be called the level of socio-spatial formations.[2] We find at least seven such changed formations defined by spatial and social characteristics: citadels, gentrified neighborhoods, exclusionary enclaves, urban regions, edge cities, ethnic enclaves and excluded "racial" ghettos. These formations and their relationship to the more general structural spatial developments are strongly related to the processes of globalization, and we believe merit much further attention.

Citadels, in the form of hi-tech, generally hi-rise megaprojects, are becoming prevalent throughout the world, from London to Shanghai, Los Angeles to Kuala Lumpur, Detroit to São Paulo, Paris to Bandung. Of the cities discussed in this book, Frankfurt, New York City, Sydney, Singapore and Brussels contain classic examples, as does Tokyo, where citadels of government and of business share the skyline; Calcutta is on the way; Rio de Janeiro would like to be. The architectural style remains modern; it was dubbed the international style already in 1932, but has really earned that name now. Postmodern treatment of the edges (or more literally the tops) of such edifices do nothing to alter the modern technical rationality of their construction. Fashions in styles may vary, but the representation of power, of wealth, of luxury, is inherent, as is the isolation, the separation, the distancing from the older urban surroundings. The grid of lower Manhattan may be carried into the street pattern of Battery Park City and visible to an interested observer in a helicopter, but the separation of the World Trade Center/Battery Park City complex from the rest of the city visually, and in terms of secure entrance, is obvious to all.

The use of the citadels is not however confined to those living in the luxury city; professionals, technicians, managers, administrators to carry out the functions assigned to them are indispensable. And, layered in time, the janitors, parking garage attendants, security guards needed for the effective operation of the citadel must be allowed in. Residentially, a few may walk to work there from the gentrified city, the city of the gentry, if it has a foothold nearby; some may fly in by helicopter to land on the roof landing pads that characterize, for instance, almost every office building in Bernini,

in São Paulo; but most will commute in by some form of limited transportation access, likely to be expensive but publicly subsidized, and likely to permit access even from a distance without treading on the ground of the rest of the more mundane city.

Gentrified neighborhoods are well known to the literature, and their essential characteristics were described in our Introduction. Functionally, globalization has produced a class of professionals, managers, technicians, that may well be analogized to the gentry of earlier days in feudal systems. As they increase in numbers, so do they increase in importance and in income, and the residential locations they choose become ever more clearly identified and separated. The gentrified city is often located in the inner parts of the older cities, or in neighborhoods adjacent to this part. The attractiveness of areas close to the inner cities, the places where "urban" activity is centered, is particularly attractive to the gentry; and because these are often areas formerly occupied by the working class, the link between gentrification and displacement is close (Marcuse, 1985).

The relationship between gentrified areas and citadels requires further detailed investigation. There is probably, in each urban area, a separation between those truly in control, and those who work for them, even at high levels within organizational structures. The separation is probably visible in the size and location of second homes, but very likely of first homes also. The top of the hierarchy is not likely to be involved in the process of gentrification, although, after a neighborhood has been converted, units within it may serve them as *pieds-à-terre*. More likely, they will find more convenient accommodation, whether within the citadels themselves or in the older fashionable upper-class neighborhoods of the city.

Exclusionary enclaves are not new in the world, but their spread has been phenomenal in the last several decades. The walled communities of the rich, gated communities more closed from the rest of society than ever before, are now to be found, not only in the United States, but also in Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro and many cities all over the world. Such luxury sites are still not very usual in European countries, but are becoming more and more important there also. We would expect to see a substantial expansion of these kinds of enclaves, housing many of those most directly benefiting from processes of globalization, business people, managers, leading artists and politicians, who have homes in many places of the world and are quite able to live isolated from their immediate surroundings. The residents live in walled communities, not spatially dependent on any particular geographical location in relation to the rest of the city. They rather create and control their own environment at the micro level.

Walling and gating by themselves are not sufficient to define a sociospatial pattern, for the fact (or the symbol) of gating has spread to virtually all sectors of society; today one finds public housing projects in the United

States, middle class suburbs, upper-middle class enclaves, retirement communities, with walls of various sorts around them, or with the equivalent measures designed to provide physical protection against social dangers (Blakely and Snyder, 1995; Marcuse, 1997a). It is the extent of this development, with a specific focus on its appearance for communities of those made prosperous by the processes of economic change, to which we wish to call attention here.

Exclusionary enclaves have been formed, not only by the gentry, but also around some areas of the rich, and are wished for, and often obtained, by residents of the suburban city, and even on occasion by those in the working class. Passing a certain stage in life, retirement communities may house (although separately) people with varying economic resources and earlier positions. Gentrified areas, almost by definition, cannot erect walls to define their boundaries, since they are encroachments on and reuses of areas previously occupied by poorer residents. Here the exclusion and control are accomplished by social, rather than physical, means (although individual buildings will have their own security systems, bars on windows, fences and gates at entry): the police presence will be enhanced, and private security guards will patrol.

Regionalization both of residences and workplaces is the general phenomenon of which edge cities are a major component. As Keil and Ronneberger describe it most specifically, it goes well beyond the metropolitanization and sprawl that have long been known. It includes not only edge city development but also closer relationships between long-time independent cities to form economically integrated regions. In this book, the "insular configurations" described around Frankfurt, Waley's description of the developments around Tokyo, and Chakravorty's of "new town" development around Calcutta, reveal the regional nature of development "at the edge."

Edge cities are a component of these new regions that may be seen as a totalized form of the suburban city that is significantly new. The definition of course cannot be that used by Garreau (1991), for he considers only those that in fact have only recently been built, rather than all those that carry the function of edge cities, and attributes their existence to simple consumer preferences, while in fact they are the results of much more complex processes in which consumer preferences initially play a very minor role. Our reference here is to clusters of residence, business, commerce, and recreation, on an urban scale, removed from major central cities but related to them, whose independence in daily life from those central cities is in large part their reason for being. Keil and Ronneberger's discussion of Frankfurt in this volume highlights the regional view which must be taken to understand properly the economic as well as social role of such edge cities. As opposed to metropolitan development, or megacity growth, the point here is insulation, the down-playing of dependence, coupled with the development of activities that emulate and in fact bring to the suburban location the same

international business firms, the same professional consulting activities, the same cultural amenities, the same concerts and museums and theaters, the same religious institutions, that the central city has, if on a smaller scale.

Ethnic enclaves (to be distinguished both from exclusionary enclaves and from excluded ghettos) are perhaps the purest form, the functional equivalent, of the working class quarters of the traditional industrial cities of the 19th century. The pattern is the same everywhere (and only stringent government regulation prevents its reproduction in Singapore): new arrivals in the cities are used for lower-paid work, exploited more than their longer fellow-residents might tolerate, and residentially stay together for mutual support in difficult conditions. In time, such areas may lose their economic function because the pressures that prompted their residents to maintain them have abated, though residents of similar cultural or ethnic or religious background may still stay near each other, as Logan shows for New York City. The clustering such data shows may be seen as moving from the economic to cultural as its binding force. Singapore provides another example: as Van Grunsven describes it, the reclustering of Malays in social housing despite strenuous governmental efforts to produce integration shows the strength of cultural ties (as well, perhaps, as the lack of real economic and political integration).

The *excluded ghetto*, as defined in our Introduction, seems to be, thus far, primarily a phenomenon of the United States. It takes, in our analysis, a specific combination of "racial", political and economic circumstances to produce such a ghetto: specifically, a combination of 1) a new form of urban poverty, long-lasting and deep and excluded from the expectation of conjunctural change, 2) discrimination against a specific and identifiable (most readily by color) group, discrimination with wide social prevalence and deep historical roots, but against a group with strong formal claims to equality and full citizenship, and 3) the absence of countervailing state action.

The first of these factors, the new form of urban poverty, exists not only in the United States, but has its parallel in almost every major city in the world. In some cases, such as Calcutta or Rio de Janeiro, it is overlaid on a century or more of both abysmal poverty and social exclusion; in others, as in Sydney or Frankfurt, it is a new appearance, a matter of growing concern but yet nowhere near the dimensions of the first group. In New York City, it is well documented (e.g., Fainstein et al., 1992); in Tokyo, Waley suggests here, official denial of the existence of concentrated poverty is probably contrary to fact. But the tendency to impoverishment and exclusion is detectable in all globalizing cities, and its sources have been extensively elucidated in the literature. The second characteristic, discrimination against an easily targeted group, is also increasingly visible in many places, and a source of concern in most. By and large that discrimination is against non-citizens, however, so that the claims that account for some of the tensions in "race"

relations in the United States are absent. Where there is full citizenship and concern about discriminatory treatment, as in West Germany against residents of the former East German state, there is no color line to facilitate discrimination, and the spatial pattern tends to be more regionally based than intra-urban. In other cases, as in the Netherlands, the third factor is critical: affirmative state action to avoid ghetto formation (see Van Kempen and Priemus, 1997).

Thus the pattern of "racial" exclusion and segregation as found in the United States is not at this time replicated elsewhere on any comparable scale. Whether the forces that lead to economic polarization and the social relations attendant on immigration will spread after the pattern of the United States remains a matter not yet determined. On the issue of levels of discrimination, William Goldsmith argues strongly that the very strength of the pattern in the United States influences directly the strength of patterns elsewhere, thus an argument supporting the expectation of increased replication of the United States pattern. But it is also clear that the end result, in spatial as well as social terms, will be dependent to a large degree on the future direction of governmental policies and their implementation in each country.

Soft[3] locations

We outlined, in the Introduction, our expectation that there would be a particular set of locations in which the processes of globalization and post-Fordist economic change were likely to have a particular impact. Recapitulating but adding to that list:

- waterfronts
- currently centrally located manufacturing areas
- brownfields (formerly industrial sites)
- central city office and residential locations
- central city amusement locations and tourist sites
- concentrations of social housing
- locations on the fringe of central business districts
- historic structures
- public spaces

Beauregard and Haila have looked at some of these locations: waterfronts, brownfields and centrally located manufacturing areas (hollowed-out manufacturing zones), and suburbs (edge cities). They conclude that in each case there are changes, but that they follow earlier changes and are part of older patterns of change as well as new ones. That point can, of course, be made, *pari passu*, of all of the soft locations mentioned above. But the chapter also concludes that spatial change in the already built environment lags behind

broader social and economic changes, and the question now becomes, as time goes on, will the changes grow and/or turn into something "new?" Bearing in mind our earlier comment on the imprecision of the concept "new," we here present some tentative conclusions for the areas mentioned above.

Waterfronts: Building on arguments made by Beauregard/Haila and Chakravorty in this volume, two periods may be separated out in the evolution of the use of waterfronts in the last one hundred years. The first has to do with the role of shipping. In the most industrialized countries, waterfronts are no longer vital shipping or trans-shipping locations. In many cities where they had once played a central role, shipping is rather concentrated in fewer locations where larger scale facilitates, efficient modernization, and inland transportation access is good. Thus New York City, originally located where it is because of its harbor, now finds most of its waterfront obsolete for shipping purposes. That is a phenomenon that has indeed been going on since the 1920s, and certainly since the 1950s.

Sometime thereafter, however, a second phase of change set in. Modern port development changed the old nature of waterfront activity radically, in some cases replacing it with large-scale modern facilities, sometimes in areas distant from old port activities (London, Tokyo), in other cases reducing it in favor of major new port development outside the city (Calcutta, Rio de Janeiro). In the older cities in the industrialized world in which economic restructuring and globalization have reduced or eliminated industrial uses of the waterfront, major efforts developed, struggling against heavy past investment in the built environment, to transform the nature and uses of the waterfront. And closely related, as we see it, to the current process of globalization, and thus defining a new period in the evolution of waterfronts as locations, is the absorption of these previously neglected and under-utilized waterfront areas as adjuncts to the growing dominance of downtown service-oriented activities for the benefit of the new gentry. Waterfronts become amenities making CBDs more attractive. The common cultural essence of these reuses are traced in Beauregard Haila's contribution here. The movement from the first phase to the second phase warrants the characterization of major change, although the process of change is itself hardly new.

Centrally located manufacturing locations: Again, we find a long-term process of change, and "new" developments. The movement of large-scale manufacturing from crowded central locations to the outskirts of cities has long been noted; greenfield sites are both physically and economically more advantageous for large-scale manufacturing, and the transportation and communication disadvantages of outlying sites have steadily been reduced or in fact reversed. The extension of this trend to small manufacturing, however, including to those involved in production directly related to other central city activities (e.g. printing, fashion dress design, repair facilities), is of more recent origin. These are activities conducted more efficiently in close proximity

to the center, unlike the earlier out-movers. But they also are being displaced, as the growth of pure service sector activities and their internationally-linked financial returns raises real estate prices to the point where socially incompatible uses are displaced, even if economically integral to the activities displacing them. The current dispute about the rezoning of the area occupied by printing firms in the heart of the business district of New York City is an example.

Brownfield sites: Certainly the movement of manufacturing activities from less to more favorable locations (whether physically or economically judged) is not a new phenomenon. The difference between brownfield locations, generally not in the centers of cities, and those described above is that here the process is not of displacement, as in central locations, but rather simply of abandonment. Partially because of the difficulty of adapting the massive built form of outdated industrial plants to other uses (although cases exist of transformation of warehouses to condominiums, artist's lofts, etc.) and partially because of enduring environmental pollution, such sites often find no re-use: hence "hollowed-out." The scale of such hollowing-out has significantly accelerated in the period of globalization, as is traced above. It is also beginning to affect locations recently developed, where there is no physical problem of obsolescence but simply shifts of international or national investment: thus automotive plants built in São Paulo on what were greenfield sites just thirty years ago now face abandonment. The pace of the process of industrial abandonment seems to be remarkably accelerated today.

Locations of *concentrations of social housing* of have been subject to much study recently (Power, 1997; Vale, 1993; Varady et al., 1998). Some of the issues are large-scale, as in the rehabilitation of the large developments built in the after-war years throughout eastern Europe and in much of the West. Other concerns deal with inner-city high-rise developments, often deteriorating for political as well as physical and social reasons. The problems are not, of course, new, but the process of globalization and its accompanying economic changes and social impacts, in particular polarization of incomes and exclusion, put concentrated locations of social housing at the center of issues of segregation and abandonment or gentrification. The locational aspects of these problems, and their relationship to the overall spatial structure of cities, is however as yet under-researched.

Other soft locations have been dealt with in various contributions in this volume, as well as in many other places. Gentrification is an aspect of change in *locations on the fringe of central business districts*, but such locations are subject to other forms of change besides gentrification: sometimes simply clearance to provide amenity benefits to the center, sometimes changes of uses, from low-level to high-level services (warehousing to offices or residences), or from office to residence or the reverse, or for transportation infrastructure whose location and form have clear dividing effects. In

general, the result is a shift in uses from residential to business, meaning generally a net reduction in the residential use of central areas, as Waley for instance points out in Tokyo.

The examples above suggest that an approach focusing on "soft locations" deserves more thorough comparative study than it has hitherto received. The attitudes towards *structures of historic meaning*, for instance, have changed significantly in the last few decades, in ways not unrelated specifically to the pressures of globalization. As national boundaries are more readily and frequently crossed, the threat to local identity mounts; at the same time, the importance of identity, and specifically the linkage of identity to territory (in different ways both on the national, the regional and the local level) grows.

Public spaces have similarly undergone significant change, in form, usage, and control. The general movement is towards private control of what is done in public spaces. Sometimes that private control is exercised through pressure on public authorities, as in the "cleaning up" of Times Square (New York) or "amusement districts" in European cities; sometimes it is done directly privately, as in the use of private security guards by Business Improvement Districts or the managers of gated communities. Sometimes, ironically, the privatization of public space comes about through the offering of semi-public facilities in legally private spaces, e.g. malls, shopping centers. The net result is the same: the amount and openness of space for "public" activities is eroded (Christopherson, 1994). *Tourist locations* are increasingly prominent as the object of both public attention and private investment, producing spatial changes in many cities. Thus a common pattern of change in comparable locations is visible, though it does not rise to the scale of a new structural spatial order, because it largely represents a continuation of pre-existing trends.

The Dangers of Common Generalizations

American exceptionalism

William Goldsmith, one of our contributors, has written (1997): "European cities are the envy of the world. They enjoy prosperity and harmony" (p. 299) and " . . . compared either to cities in America or those of the Third World, they still are well-watered oases in a world of urban drought" (p. 310). Although he might be overstating the positive aspects of European cities, we think that indeed the comparison between American cities – and especially those in the United States – and cities elsewhere reveals striking contrasts, contrasts derived from their location in different states, with different ideologies, different economies, different histories, different physical settings. Extreme situations like the new urban ghetto and the exclusionary

enclave are, however, not something weird and typical only of urban areas on one side of the north Atlantic. Dangers that such areas will become typical for other cities are evident, and the tendencies in that direction are revealed in the contributions in this book.

But is the exclusionary ghetto at this time typical of the United States only? For the moment we would say yes, because only in the United States can we find the awkward combination of economic developments that lead to structural unemployment with racism, and with a private market ideology which in combination legitimate the exclusion of the poor and the concomitant restricted influence of the state. These are the factors that lead to ghetto formation. According to Badcock (this volume) and Stilwell (1996), Australian cities do not have ghettos. According to Dutch researchers, the same holds for the Netherlands (e.g. Van Kempen 1997).

If we accept that the excluded ghetto is now a typical US phenomenon, the next question would be if we expect the excluded ghetto to emerge in other countries and on other continents in due time. Tendencies certainly point in this direction. The retreat of the welfare state in Western European countries, in combination with bad economic perspectives, especially for those who have the wrong education, and more specifically for those who belong to specific ethnic or racial groups – the former guestworkers in Western Europe are a case in point – must be seen as a dangerous combination of factors and developments (Van Kempen and Van Weesep, 1998). The situation in Third World countries, on the other hand, presents a substantially different pattern from that of those in the first World; Sanjoy Chakravorty makes the point explicitly, and we return to it below in the discussion of contingencies.

Thus the trends to be found in the United States are not strikingly different from the trends in other developed countries discussed in this book, although the patterns resulting from them may have developed further. The United States manifests many of these trends – and in particular the development of the excluded ghetto – in extreme form. The reason for the differences are not so hard to find: size and wealth, permitting a tolerance for a degree of social tension by providing a way out and a general lifting of boats (from the movement west to the exploitation of vast natural resources to triumph in the last world war); a historical tradition of little government, with a free private market ideology; and racism, which legitimates the exclusion of a major group of citizens. Thus, the contingencies that differentiate developments in the United States from those in other countries are variations in the same contingencies that differentiates each country from the others.

Globalization, global cities, globalizing cities

Globalization is a controversial concept, whose very definition is unclear. We have specified our use of the term in the Introduction. While there is little

doubt that the process of globalization is a real one, it is still unclear how far the effects of globalization reach in particular cities. What has become clear from the present book is that what is changing is related to the processes of globalization, but not only globalization, and often indirectly more than directly. If globalization is understood with the contents we have outlined in the Introduction, then it is only one of a number of contingencies in explaining the formation of changes in the spatial order: we begin to enumerate the others we find central below.

Further, globalization is an extension of an internationalization of economic activity that has been going on since history began, marked by a radically increased mobility of capital and international integration of production and control, facilitated by advances in communications and transportation technology. The decline of the provision of welfare by the state, most explicitly symbolized by Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan in the United States, is a shift in what the state does, not a decline in its overall role. The state remains even more involved in facilitating business activity than before (Panitch, 1998), but with less redistributive intent than in the immediate postwar period. Labor organizations are weaker, and capital stronger, both as a result and as a cause of these tendencies; union membership has declined dramatically since the immediate postwar period. Thus the ability of working class forces and their allies to move, or keep, the state in a welfare orientation, and to resist the negative impacts of globalization on working conditions and employment, is severely diminished.

Thus globalization, important as it is, is only one of the forces determining the spatial pattern of cities, and a force not coming into play for the first time in the recent period. It must be seen as the extension of forces already present over a much longer period of time.

Global cities is a term that has become accepted as a way to describe cities at the apex of a postulated global hierarchy of cities, determined primarily by their role as locations of the control functions of multinational finance. Aspects of two of the cities universally included among the "global," Tokyo and New York, are commented on in chapters in this volume. They are very different from each other in their spatial configurations. While they have trends in common, they have major differences, and do not lend themselves to the construction of some "generally applicable model of the 'global city'" (Harloe and Fainstein, 1992, p. 246), abstracted from historical context and other contingencies. And they each have trends in common with, and major differences from, cities lower in the international hierarchy of cities, as the other contributors in this volume show. Keil and Ronneberger would propose Frankfurt as a global city, but stress that it is the region as a whole that should thus considered. Logan raises doubts as to whether economic change is so different in New York from that in "non-global" cities. Waley, in the other "global city" discussed in this volume, argues that the "new" spatial

patterns there are as much an accentuation of pre-existing trends as a product of a new globalization. For purposes of examining changes in spatial form, the "global cities" focus is something of a red herring.

Globalizing cities is thus the term we are using, to reflect two different points: that (almost)[4] all cities are touched by the process of globalization and that involvement in that process is not a matter of being either at the top or the bottom of it, but rather of the nature and extent of influence of the process. We do *not*, by using the term, suggest that the nature of that involvement is uniform, and certainly not that all cities are converging on a single model of "globalized" city. And in fact it may be appropriate to speak of "deglobalizing cities," at least relatively: Rio de Janeiro, as Telles and Ribiero describe it, may be such a one.

The Limitations of a Purely Spatial Focus

Even though the metaphor of the divided city, or the quartered city with walls between the quarters, highlights key changes, in scale if not in nature, of the spatial order of cities, it does not adequately capture the life-world experience of the residents and users of these separate quarters. Spatial change is both a consequence and a cause of changes in the lives of urban residents, but those changes cannot be adequately captured through examination only of spatial patterns. This is so for a number of reasons.

The first is that individuals experience the city both as part of their life-worlds and as part of their integration into its economic world. The residents and the business users of the city are not necessarily the same people, and even when they are, they experience the city in quite different capacities. A striking example of the differences can be seen in some of the political conflicts in New York City in recent years. Here individuals who are in the real estate business and act as developers of property in Manhattan strongly support the loosening of zoning restrictions, the building to high densities and the gentrification of neighborhoods. But at the same time, as residents of the city, they oppose building in the immediate vicinity of their homes, oppose higher appraisals of their residences that would increase their taxes, fight development proposals that would harm their personal lives outside of work. They use the city in one way, experience it as residents in another.

Secondly, the metaphor of the walled and quartered city implies, incorrectly, that individuals are confined within their quarters for all of their activities and at all times. But, precisely because the residential and the economic quarters of the city are not congruent, there is passage from one to the other by most people and generally every day. The conception of the ideal city (in the past often espoused by planners) as one where one lives and works in the same place – minimizing the travel time to work is the standard

formulation – hardly has substance today. Commuting is taken for granted; making it short and comfortable is the goal, not eliminating it. Only in odd and questionable circumstances is the approach to provide employment where a person lives.

Again, the United States, and specifically New York City, gives us two examples: the Empowerment Zone plans, in which poor African Americans are to be supplied with jobs within the zones where they already live, and the so-called "edge cities," in which a deliberate attempt is made to provide work space, overwhelmingly offices, in suburban communities also being developed for housing. "Race," in the United States context, plays a major role in both conceptions: in the one case, to keep blacks in the ghettos, in the other, to prevent middle-class whites from having to have contact with them. Otherwise, even where communities are existing or developed with both economic and residential opportunities, the two are kept spatially separate. Working at home remains the exception rather than the rule, and working in the same district as where one lives is not always possible, because the jobs available may not coincide with the education or the skills of those who live in that neighborhood, for economic or political reasons or for reasons of racial separation. The point to be taken here is that a given individual occupies different spaces for different activities. Every metaphor of the city, be it the divided, the dual, the fragmented, quartered or the divided city must reflect these dynamics.

This brings us to the third reason the static metaphor of walling and quartering is inadequate: the time dimension. Not only do people occupy their homes and go to work in different places, they also do so at different times each day. In the rich white suburbs of Johannesburg the white home owners go to work in the morning, and the black servants come in as they leave; the residential area changes from white to black at eight in the morning. In the downtown skyscrapers in the Central Business Districts of many cities all over the world, the lawyers leave their offices at five or six in the evening; the cleaning crews, earning one-fiftieth of what the lawyers make, come in after they go, and are gone when the lawyers return the next morning. The same space is occupied by very different people at the different times. In the recent rediscovery of the importance of space, the time nexus is often overlooked.

So the image of the divided city must take into account the different spatial structure of residential as against economic activities; must take into account the movement of individuals between one and the other quarter; must reflect the temporal aspect, in which different spaces are occupied by different persons as different times for different purposes; and must reflect the nature of the differences across the lines of division.

The Layered City

These limitations on simple spatial analysis of divisions in a quartered city bring us to another issue. It is misleading to speak of "*the* city" as if it were a whole, organic, entity. The organic metaphor for the city stems from the Chicago school in the 1920s, which envisaged cities as growing and/or declining organically, with a life cycle that could be described as that of any organism could be. But this conception is simply wrong. "The city" is not an actor; it is a place occupied and used by many actors. A city does not prosper or decline, particular groups in it do, and generally in very different fashion. What is a crisis for one group may be prosperity for the other. Development may mean profits for one, displacement for the other. A corporate headquarters moving out of town may be a disaster for its local employees, but bring a surge in the price of its stock for its owners. Gentrification is a move up for some, a burden for others. A "city" is not global; some of those doing business in it are, but others very like them will do business very similar to that in other "non-global" cities. Those doing business on a global scale will have a similar impact on the spaces of the cities in which they do business, wherever they are. That impact may be concentrated in some cities, but that is because of what those actors do in them, not because that "city" has done something.

If cities were ever unitary entities, as both common usage, which sees cities as "actors," and many sociologists considered them to be, that characterization does not hold today. Each city is multiple cities, layered over and under each other, separated by both space and time, constituting the living and working environment of different classes and different groups, interacting with each other in a set of dominations and dependencies that reflect increasing distance and inequality. David Harvey (1994, p. 381) appropriately speaks of the dangers of "reinforcing reifications . . . it is invidious to regard places . . . cities . . . as 'things in themselves.'" He is speaking of the impact of global processes in particular, but the point applies to internal processes and divisions as well.

We suggest the metaphor of a *layered city* as one that begins to capture these complex dimensions of division.[5] One separation would be into different layers reflecting separations in life-worlds. This conception gives us the possibility to see that black and white professionals live at different locations, but that a map of their workplaces will show much less difference; it operates at a different layer. One layer represents residential space; a second layer represents workplace. On a third layer, one could visualize transportation patterns, with usage at each hour of the day. A different layer may show where children go to school; another, where the recreational facilities or the commercial facilities used by each group are located. Each layer shows the entire space of the city, but no one layer shows the complete city. Some layers reflect differences in

usage, others differences in time, others differences in the components of the built environment. Each one reflects a divided city.

The concept of layering and the introduction of the element of time into the analysis of spatial patterns highlights the importance of a fact that has impressed us more and more forcefully as we have reviewed the contributions to this book: that the trends here described cannot be understood without placing them in the context of earlier developments (see also Kesteloot's chapter in this volume). Specifically, what is new is often a continuation, in more extreme form, of conflicts and divisions that have existed since the beginning of the capitalist transformation of cities, and to some extent since the beginnings of the formation of cities themselves. In physical terms, then, the spatial order of cities today reveals a layering of different cities, an overlapping in space and in time. What is changing in the present period may be the extent to which the layers are unconnected socially, economically, and politically from each other.

The Multiple Contingencies of Comparative Analysis

The trends revealed in the contributions to this volume are much more contingent than we had expected. The new and/or globalizing trends vary substantially in their impact on different cities. Specifically, the extent and forms of impact hinges on an ascertainable and limited number of contingencies. We list here the major contingencies affecting the way in which the general trends we have outlined become manifest. The list contains nothing surprising. We discuss each item briefly, simply to indicate the nature of the influences involved and to suggest a possible framework for systematic study in the future.

Variations in patterns are to be expected as consequence of:

- The contingency of geography (the pre-existing natural and built environment of the city)
- The contingency of history
- The contingency of economics (level of economic development)
- The contingency of globalization (position in the processes of globalization)
- The contingency of race (its history of racial and ethnic relations)
- The contingency of inequality (polarization both in numbers and in shares of wealth)
- The contingency of politics (the distribution of political power in its decision-making structure)

We take it for granted that *geography*, the physical pattern of development of a city, will be heavily influenced by its physical setting. Manhattan would not

have skyscrapers were it not situated on bedrock, Amsterdam's central business district was irrevocably tied to the canals running through it, Johannesburg's development was dependent on the extent and location of gold-bearing strata, for many cities their relation to their harbor is crucial, and so forth. Such factors are largely background for our purposes, although the extent to which "natural" factors were or are rigid constraints should not be exaggerated. The same is true, if to a lesser extent, to the influence of the *existing built environment*: the existing location of major buildings, of residential settlements, of transportation infrastructure, of utilities, will constrain the impact of forces of change and be subject to policy input only at the margins. Going into these constraints in detail goes beyond the scope of this volume, although it is ultimately essential for a detailed understanding of developments in any particular city. We take them to establish the canvas on which new shapes may be painted, the physical bounds within which social and economic changes must take place.

The contingency of history. History is of course an all-encompassing term that can embrace the examination of everything that has developed in the past. In this sense it is really the major determinant of physical form and spatial pattern. But we mean it more narrowly here, to call attention to the rootedness of political, social, economic, and ideological events in their own past development and interrelatedness, very much in the spirit of John Friedmann's caution:

"If we neglect the ... rootedness [of world cities] in a politically organized 'life space', with its own history, institutions, culture, and politics (the difference between Paris and London, for example) – much of what we observe will remain unintelligible." (Friedman in Knox and Taylor, 1995, p. 34).

The comment applies not only to world cities, and not only to their life spaces. The much longer history of European cities compared to North American ones, their background in a feudal system absent in the United States, the non-capitalist history of eastern European cities, the impact of colonialism both on imperial and colonized countries, the variations in local autonomy, are all critical in understanding the differences in development of the cities discussed in this volume. Sanjoy Chakravorty stresses this point eloquently in his discussion of Calcutta. A few studies have disaggregated these historical factors to examine their separate impact on city development and they reveal the importance of looking at political/institutional/cultural factors as a whole, rather than focusing on, say, the level of centralization as a separate factor.

The *type of development* can be decisive in shaping change. Type, not stage, of development, for it is not at all clear that development proceeds in a linear fashion, or that less developed countries must follow the patterns established

by their more developed cousins. Not only are alternate paths of develop-
ment conceivable, but the very definition of development may vary. Certain-
ly the extent of the resource available in the society as a whole has an impact
on the shape of that society: that the poor are pushed to the outskirts of cities
in many Third World countries, for instance, while similar locations are
desirable for the middle class in others, has something to do with the ability
to provide infrastructure over large territories in the one and the scarcity of
resources for the purpose in the other. The level of urbanization itself, in-
cluding for instance the importance of rural-to-urban migration, will simi-
larly affect how other trends play themselves out.

Related to the level of economic development, often paralleling the degree
of urbanization, the presence or absence of often rural-based traditions of
family and kinship are significant contingencies affecting the way in which
production is organized and consumption takes place. Development is not
only an economic concept, but as well a cultural, social, and institutional
one.

Just as speaking of the level of development should not imply a single
linear range of possibilities, so *position in the process of globalization* should not
imply that cities can be measured on a linear scale of "more" or "less"
globalized. Not only does globalization take many forms (from extent of
informationalization to importance of international trade to level and form
of technological development), but the proportional role of any of these
forms in the life of a city can vary. Thus some cities may have highly ad-
vanced and tightly concentrated isles of communications sophistication in a
surrounding that is essentially independent of it, perhaps still agriculturally
based, while another may have residents most of whose incomes are derived
from working for low-wage international companies, thus tightly integrated
into global production, but very little affected by hi-tech communication. On
the other hand, there may be cities in countries largely outside the circle of
any of these aspects of globalization, as is often said about many African
cities. Whether a city is a "globalizing city," therefore, cannot be answered
by any simple measure on a linear scale of "more" or "less" globalized,
ignoring the way in which it is integrated into globalization processes.

Third World cities differ both in their position in the process of globaliza-
tion and in their type of development from First World cities. Where relative
deindustrialization is the pattern in the typical First World city, this is in
large part because industrial production has been moved to the Third World.
New York City may experience deindustrialization, but Calcutta is industri-
alizing. The processes involved may, however, fundamentally be similar: Rio
de Janeiro makes an interesting comparison with Detroit, for instance, in
losing industry (after a period of rapid industrial growth) and seeking but not
finding services to take its place.

"Race" plays a very large role in some countries, an insignificant one in

others. The category itself, of course, is not a scientific one; it can only be
defined in social terms, and then only in terms of social relationships be-
tween groups. To say that a country is "racially homogeneous" is simply to
say that its residents do not separate themselves from each other by a cat-
egory they denominate "race", to say that it is "racially mixed" is simply to
say that lines of division have been socially shaped and called "race." In this
sense "race" is a dominant factor in examining the distribution of residence
in the United States, paralleled only, perhaps, by South Africa. While "ra-
cial" divisions play some role elsewhere, nowhere else do they approach the
order of magnitude they have in these two countries. Two distinctions are
important here: between cultural differences and racial differences, and be-
tween racially defined groups and immigrants.

The literature on post-colonialism has raised some critical questions about
the relationship between imperialism/colonialism, nationalism, and "race",
and the relation of each to cultural differences. Thus, Etienne Balibar writes
of what he calls the "new racism:"

"The new racism is a racism of the era of decolonization, of the reversal of popula-
tion movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division
of humanity within a single political space. It is a racism, whose dominant theme is
not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences . . . differen-
tial racism." (Balibar, 1991, p. 186; see also: Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991).

Balibar is speaking of the linkage between racism, cultural differentiation,
and colonialism. These ingredients are found in different mixes; it seems to
us important to separate out those cultural differences which are non-hierar-
chical in nature, for whose spatial reflection we have used the term "en-
claves", from those that are hierarchical, and generally associated with "race"
and often with colonialism, which we label "ghettos" (Marcuse, 1997b).

"Immigrants" is too broad a category to be satisfactory for our purposes,
as Logan points out. Immigrants living in the American Colony in Jerusa-
lem, the employees of multinationals abroad, the English in Canton in the
first third of the century, all formed imperial citadels in the cities in which
they lived. Working class immigrants in the United States, guestworkers in
Western Europe after the war, rural-to-urban migrants in many Third World
countries, formed enclaves for their mutual support and advancement. Dark-
skinned immigrants in some of these countries were isolated, in the United
States largely treated as on the other side of a racial boundary, and ghettoized
(Häußerman et al., 1995). Some population groups are treated as immi-
grants, which establish residential patterns (as Logan shows) well into the
second and third generation; others, although legally not "immigrants" at all
– as Russian newcomers of German origin in Germany today, who are
automatically citizens – are treated in the housing market much like Turkish,

Italian, or Greek immigrants. The same is true of Indonesians in Amsterdam. The contingency of migration, the mobility of populations, plays itself out in very different ways in the spatial patterns of cities. Visible differentiation and cultural differentiation clearly play a significant role.

Levels of *inequality* differ widely among countries; Waley places Japan among those with the least inequality, the United States is among those with the highest. The level of inequality is itself a function of other contingencies we have discussed above – as indeed each contingency is related to the others. However, having been produced, it then exercises an independent influence on the divisions of cities (in the same way that the built environment does, also a result of other contingencies but then exercising an influence of its own).

One of the most significant general outcomes of differential economic and political developments is the overall level of social inequality and social polarization within countries and cities.[6] It is possible that the degree of polarization and inequality (for a sensible discussion of the distinction between the two, see Hamnett and Cross, 1998), on the one hand, and the extent of spatial separation on the other hand, would be roughly parallel, but it would be a mistake to see this relation as an automatic one.

The final contingency to be mentioned is that of the balance of *political power*, which of course is a primary determinant of the national policy issues just mentioned. For the briefest of summaries: in most nations of the world in the immediate postwar period, a relatively stable, essentially social-democratic regime dominated policy-making, which was in most cases relatively able to provide an improvement in living conditions for the large majority and an adequate level of profits for the business community. With the election of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Ronald Reagan in the United States, and Helmut Kohl in Germany, a political turn to the right accompanied the increase in the level of those activities summarized under the caption of globalization. The shift to the right paralleled the shift of the balance of power in the economic sphere from labor to capital. Periodic protests throughout the period, particularly if they rose to the level of civil unrest, as in the mid-1960s, produced different constellations of power, but generally only briefly.[7] These shifts have obvious consequences in national policy, which in turn has consequences on spatial structure (Levine, 1995, pp. 106/7; Logan and Swanstrom, 1990). Asking what those consequences are, or can be, leads us, after a brief summary, directly to our final point: the policy implications of our analysis.

Summary

"Is there a new spatial order in cities" is the question around which this book has been centered. Our answer is: "No". But there is change, important and

visible change, with very significant impacts on the lives of our cities' people. Those changes may be summarized as an increase in the strength of divisions in the city and the inequality among them. Their specific spatial manifestations include:

- strengthened structural spatial divisions among the quarters of the city, with increased inequality and sharper lines of division among them;
- wealthy quarters, housing those directly benefiting from increased globalization, and the quarters of the professionals, managers, and technicians that serve them, growing in size and in the defensiveness of the walls erected against others;
- quarters of those excluded from the globalizing economy, with their residents more and more isolated and walled in;
- increasing walling among the quarters, from defensive citadels to gated upper and middle income communities to confined and barricaded poor neighborhoods;
- increased totalization of life within each quarter, combining residential, work, commercial, and recreational uses separately for the occupants of each;
- the increase in prevalence and depth of specific new spatial formations within these structural divisions;
- more prominent and more extensive citadels at the top, disproportionately serving a global elite;
- edge cities, an extension and expansion of the suburbanization of residence and work for the middle class and some of the professional-managerial class;
- continuing formation of immigrant enclaves of lower-paid workers both within and outside the global economy, with a continuing and often increasing emphasis on ethnic solidarity within them;
- a more integrated and much larger regionalization of economic activity, with new outer centers of activity increasing in importance;
- ghettoization of the excluded, developed in the United States, but a visible tendency in many other countries;
- a set of "soft" locations particularly vulnerable to change, which may also serve as markers of the direction and intensity of influence of globalization trends.

There is, then, no standard pattern, no "*The* Globalized City," no single new spatial order within cities all over the world. The patterns produced by the processes summarized as "globalization" are quite varied, and some are described in detail in the book. But there is a set of common trends that, taken together, form a pattern, standing in some orderly relationship to each other. Looking back at the alternate theories of the consequences of

globalization, interdependent polarization vs exclusion, in effect both are correct: the rich get richer (and form citadels and exclusionary enclaves) and the poor get poorer; most are needed (often forming immigrant enclaves), but some poor are left out (and confined to excluded ghettos).

The trends we have outlined have substantial negative consequences in terms of social justice and democracy: inequality, divisions, poverty, lack of democratic public control. Zygmunt Bauman's (1998) little book gives an excellent generalized discussion of them; the detailed accounts are legion. The rhetoric of globalization and the exaggeration of its influence can be a contributing factor legitimating those negative consequences, and making resistance to them seem futile – the TINA syndrome, "There Is No Alternative." We believe that conclusion is false. As Beauregard and Haila say, "actors ... who control the built environment are not simply puppets dancing to the tune of socio-economic and political logics ... " We believe their actions can, and should be, controlled, for the general public benefit. We thus turn, briefly, to examine some of the policy implications of our conclusions.

Implications for Public Policy

Reflection on the importance of governmental action in determining the extent and nature of changes in the spatial order of cities leads us to the single most important conclusion of our study: that the pattern of development of cities today is subject to control, *is not* the result of uncontrollable forces, *is not* the result of iron economic laws whose effects states are powerless to influence. On the contrary, in case after case we have found agency to have a major impact on structure: the actions of the state, of nation states, determined by the balance of power between/among contending forces in the economic and political sphere, is a major determinant of a city's spatial pattern, heavily influenced though it may be by the contingencies we have mentioned. A growing body of literature support the conclusion as to the key role of the state in shaping the outcomes of processes of globalization (Panitch, 1998; Longworth, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Piven, 1995; Sassen, 1996). The changed spatial order is thus determined in large part by the outcomes of conflicts among real men and women and the organizations through which they act, aligned along fissures of class, race, gender, and ideology.

Given these concerns, what policy implications follow?

First, policies oriented only to spatial patterns in a city will not work, at least if the goal is to influence the trends on which we have focused: the divisions of the city, ghettoization, exclusionary suburbanization, citadel formation. One of us is an urban planner, the other a geographer, but the traditional spatially-oriented tools of these professions, focused on land use

and geographical patterns, are not adequate to deal even with spatial divisions. That is because spatial patterns are brought about by processes that are not themselves simply spatial. Globalization of course takes place in space, inherently so, but it is produced by developments in the production of goods and services, their control, the technology they use, the shifting economic and political relations among owners, workers and users. Power relations are manifested in space, and can be strengthened by spatial patterns, but the major bases for the distribution of power have today only secondarily to do with its spatial location; the power of a multinational can be exercised wherever it is located. The actual and potential power of the state over the uses of space within its borders is great; whether and in what direction that power is used is not determined by the existing distribution of space, but rather by the existing distribution of decision-making power in and over the state. The same is true of the other key factors that we have found to influence spatial patterns: racism, for instance, while both strengthened by and promoting patterns of segregation within cities, does not have its origins in such patterns. The measures required go beyond the bounds of this book; they include such matters as welfare state policies generally; internationally-agreed-upon social standards such as were attempted to be introduced in the Maastricht and NAFTA treaties; environmental regulation; national and international improvements in labor standards, and in the rights to organize by labor; increases in informed democratic decision-making; readjustment of the balance between private property rights and public policy decisions; and so on. Policies designed to influence spatial patterns cannot be confined to spatial policies.

Nevertheless, and this is the second implication, state spatial policies can have a dramatic effect on the divisions of the city. This can work positively (for example in the Netherlands, where the enormous number of attractive dwellings in the social rented sector has prevented large-scale segregation) or negatively (for example in the United States, where the concentration of public housing in ghetto areas has served to reinforce the exclusionary ghettos described earlier in this chapter). The allocation of social housing, as Van Grunsven describes in Singapore, and land use policies, as Keil and Ronneberger describe for Frankfurt, have dramatic effects on spatial structure, and can be used to reduce the divisions created by globalization. Examples could be multiplied: they range from the socially-oriented handling of competition among cities (or national-level legislation limiting it) to the ways tourism is promoted, to sensitive territorially-based development programs, to finding the right balance between privatization and public enterprise, to educational and training programs, to regulation of the private rental housing market, to socially-oriented zoning and land use regulations.

On a few issues, a third implication of the analysis here, spatial policies need to come to grips with contradictions as yet insufficiently thought through.

Key among these are attitudes towards enclaves and attendant goals for integration. Ethnic enclaves have strong positive attributes, as well as social dangers: they promote solidarity and supportive networking, but separate and inhibit interaction with others. Both land use and economic development policies can encourage or hinder their solidification; the balanced approach to these conflicting aspects has yet to be found. The theoretical goal of openness and diversity conflicts with freedom of choice and social solidarity (as well as with racism and prejudiced exclusion); a democratically sound and practically feasible balance needs to be found. In principle, there is no reason why public policy should interfere with enclave formation, so long as it is truly voluntary, that is, that anyone resident in an enclave has the realistic possibility of moving out. We would thus conclude that the policy in Singapore (see Van Grunsven in this volume), which is directly aimed at weakening the solidarity that co-residence in an enclave promotes, is wrong.[8] It was a policy very similar to that of the south in the United States in the days of slavery, when "the basic housing custom was to keep the Negroes divided; to require that slaves live with their masters or their agents; to spread the blacks throughout the town; to prevent concentration of colored people free from the control of whites" (Wade, 1964 in Bracey et al., 1971, pp. 11–12). In a sense, the policy of precluding free enclave formation might be considered *negative ghettoization*, similarly, forcing people to live where they do not wish, in this case away from those with whom they would like to be near. Yet the dangers of real ghetto formation must also be of concern.

*   *   *

We conclude, perhaps surprisingly, on an optimistic note. The specter of an overwhelming tidal wave of globalization, sweeping across continents, engulfing all cities, producing a consistent pattern of polarization, exploitation and exclusion around the world, is unfounded – perhaps not unfounded as a fear, but unduly pessimistic as a reality. For the citizens (and residents, for rights of citizenship remain subject to contestation too) of cities around the world have influenced their development in many active ways, and produced results, through political measures, through the instrumentality of the state and through resistance in civil society, that show globalization to be far from an unstoppable and unidirectional force. In comparing developments in the cities in this volume the impact of what people have done in confronting global economic forces is everywhere visible. The literature on globalization is beginning to focus more on the possibilities of control of the processes and their consequence, beginning less to accept those consequences as inevitable or be content simply to describe them as fait accompli.[9] We believe that, too, reflects something new in the spatial ordering of cities, and something which gives hope that the forces that we lump together under the

heading "globalization" may be turned to the improvement and (re-?)unification of our cities, and away from the quartering and layering that is so evident in so many of them today.

Notes

1   We have avoided encumbering this chapter with citations except in a very few instances, since it relies on other chapters in this book itself and on our own previously published work, which is referenced in the List of References at the end.

2   "Social area" might not be a bad term for the level to which we have reference, but that term has already acquired a technical connotation as used in social area analysis, an approach we do not find adequate for our purposes, since it is an entirely statistical, untheorized presentation of only portions of important processes that are not only social (and perhaps only superficially social), but more deeply economic and political.

3   We use the term "soft" by analogy to its use in zoning practice, where a "soft" site is spoken of as one not developed to the limits its legal zoning permits, i.e. one viewed as ripe for change and new development.

4   The question of whether some cities are in fact barely touched by the processes of globalization is one we have been unable to pursue within the scope of this book, but there is a substantial argument that portions of Africa and portions of Asia are essentially outside the process of globalization beyond the point of their role in international commerce one hundred years ago (Amin, 1994).

5   The image of the layered city was first suggested in Marcuse (1999a) and is developed further in Marcuse (1999b).

6   We should of course realize that social inequality and social polarization is not fully determined by economic developments. The way the state is involved in, for example, supporting those without employment, is a powerful determinant of both kinds of inequality (see, e.g. Burgers, 1996).

7   "If the tension and anger increases sufficiently to cause civil unrest or territorial revolts, the pace to a liberalized global economy will be slowed, but only in rare cases will it be reversed. Enough of the economic surplus could be directed to strategic side payments to pacify significant areas of severe economic pain," is a cold-blooded formulation, by Gary Gappert (1997, p. 297).

8   Our judgment is influenced by the likely relation between the policy in Singapore and its non-democratic political history, but we are not in a position adequately to assess this complex relationship.

9   Among the growing body of work, see particularly that of Sassen, the Institute for Policy Studies, the World Bank Monitoring Project, and much of the discussion around the consummation of the European Union, the passage of NAFTA, the resistance to the Multinational Agreement on Investments, and the activities of the World Trade Organization.